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A traditional public key encryption system is designed to provide se-
cure communication between two parties over a public channel. Though the
security guarantees that can be achieved in this setting are very strong (e.g.
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack or chosen ciphertext attack),
the functionality provided is rather limited. For example, the encryptor must
know the (single) intended recipient and retrieve his public key before en-
crypting. If there are many recipients, the encryptor must produce a separate
ciphertext for each, which may be very inefficient.
Functional encryption presents a new vision for public key cryptosys-
tems that provide a strong combination of flexibility, efficiency, and security.
In a functional encryption scheme, ciphertexts are associated with descriptive
values x, secret keys are associated with descriptive values y, and a function
f(x, y) determines what a user with a key for value y should learn from a
ciphertext with value x. One well-studied example of functional encryption
is attribute-based encryption (ABE), first introduced by Sahai and Waters in
[63], in which ciphertexts and keys are associated with access policies over at-
tributes and subsets of attributes. A key will decrypt a ciphertext if and only
1
if the associated set of attributes satisfies the associated access policy. There
are two types of ABE systems: Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE), where ci-
phertexts are associated with access policies and keys are associated with sets
of attributes, and Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), where keys are associated with
access policies and ciphertexts are associated with sets of attributes.
In this work, we will present new techniques for constructing provably
secure functional encryption systems. We will focus on CP-ABE schemes as
our application. Our goal is to advance the state of the art in achieving strong
security guarantees for flexible, efficient systems allowing suitably expressive
access policies and providing new capabilities. Before summarizing our results,
we provide relevant context on the history of functional encryption and prior
work in this area.
1.1 A Brief History of Functional Encryption
The roots of functional encryption can be traced back to Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE), first proposed by Shamir [64]. An identity-based encryption
scheme is designed to allow any string to function as a “public key,” instead of
requiring public keys to be constructed in tandem with secret keys. For exam-
ple, this allows a user to send an encrypted message to a recipient described by
an email address, without requiring the recipient to have established a public
key. Secret keys corresponding to strings (referred to as “identities”) must be
obtained from a central authority who holds a master secret key. If we wish
to impose a hierarchical structure on keys, we can generalize identity-based
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encryption to hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE), in which a user
can delegate secret keys to her subordinates.
There are innate challenges to proving security for a functionality like
IBE which involves producing many secret keys for individual users from a
single master secret key. It is not sufficient to prevent one user from maliciously
using his own secret key to decrypt a ciphertext intended for another user - a
strong notion of security must consider collusion attacks, where a group of users
may collude in an attempt to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted to an identity
outside of the group. To model such attacks, we consider an adversary who
can collect many secret keys, choosing the corresponding identities adaptively.
At some point, the adversary must decide on an identity to attack (for which it
has not collected a secret key), and it may then continue collecting keys for any
other identities. This requires security reductions to balance two competing
goals: the simulator must be powerful enough to provide the attacker with
the many keys that it adaptively requests, but it must also lack some critical
knowledge that it can gain from the attacker’s success.
The first security proofs for IBE schemes relied on the random oracle
model, a heuristic treating a fixed function as if it were truly random. The first
security proofs given in the standard model (not relying on such a heuristic)
achieved a weaker notion of security known as selective security. The selective
security model constrains the attacker to choose the target of the attack before
seeing the public parameters of the system. This is an unrealistic restriction,
and so achieving selective security should be viewed as partial progress towards
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achieving full security, rather than as an end in itself.
The notion of selective security is quite natural in the context of the
proof technique employed by all early works in IBE and HIBE, known as
partitioning. In a partitioning proof, the simulator sets up the system so that
the space of all possible identities is partitioned into two pieces: identities for
which the simulator can make secret keys and those for which it cannot. This
provides a clear way to balance the competing goals of the simulator, who
must ensure that all the adversary’s key requests fall in the set of keys the
simulator can make and that the attacked identity falls in the complement.
This is much easier to do in the selective model, since the simulator knows
ahead of time what the attacked identity is. This allows it to form a perfectly
fitting partition, with the attacked identity being the only identity for which
the simulator cannot make a secret key.
The need for selectivity to obtain an IBE security proof in the standard
model was overcome by Boneh and Boyen [11] and also by Waters [67]. The
security proof in [67] arranges for the simulator to “guess” a partition and
abort when the attacker violates its constraints. However, the richer structure
of more advanced systems like HIBE and ABE appears to doom this approach
to incur exponential loss, since one must guess a partition that respects the
partial ordering induced by the powers allocated to the individual keys.
Meanwhile, progress for attributed-based encryption systems remained
stalled at selective security in the standard model. Following the introduction
of attribute-based systems by Sahai and Waters in [63], the subsequent works
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of [24, 38, 39, 62, 69] provided security proofs for various kinds of ABE systems
only in the selective model1.
Motivated by the relative stagnation in proof methodology for func-
tional encryption systems, Waters introduced the dual system encryption method-
ology [68]. His initial work provided fully secure and efficient IBE and HIBE
systems under standard assumptions. In [50], we provided a more elegant real-
ization of dual system encryption allowing for further efficiency improvements
in the context of HIBE. In [48], we obtained the first fully secure ABE systems
in the standard model by extending our dual system encryption methodol-
ogy. In a close follow-up work, Okamoto and Takashima [60] obtained similar
results relying on the simple and relatively standard Decisional Linear As-
sumption (DLIN). In further works [49, 51–53], we continued expanding and
enhancing the dual system encryption methodology to provide stronger secu-
rity guarantees and a growing variety of advanced functionalities, including a
multi-authority ABE system allowing the same access structures as state of
the art single authority systems.
A Contextual Note: In the works referenced above, we developed the dual
system encryption methodology in the context of composite order bilinear
groups, relying on instances and close variants of the General Subgroup De-
cision Assumption [8]. Okamoto and Takashima developed the framework
1[9] relied on the generic group heuristic instead. This should be considered as a weaker
guarantee than selective security.
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of dual pairing vector spaces in prime order bilinear groups [58, 59] and ob-
served that it could be used to implement the same proof techniques under
the more standard Decisional Linear Assumption [60, 61]. Working in prime
order groups is also advantageous for efficiency reasons, since the group orders
can be taken to be much smaller and hence pairing computations can be much
faster. In [46], we further developed the connection between the dual pairing
vector space framework and our prior approach in the composite order setting.
The collective result of these works is a functional understanding of how to
transfer dual system encryption proofs between the composite order and prime
order settings.
In this work, we have chosen to work wholly in the prime order setting.
Thus, the constructions and proofs we give here do not precisely match those
given in the works cited above. Instead, they can be viewed as the result of
translating those composite order schemes and proofs into the prime order
setting using the tools developed in [46, 58–60]. However, we will present our
tools and results in the prime order setting here from the ground up, and there
is no need for the reader to reference the prior composite order analogs.
1.2 Summary of Our Results
In this work, we develop several fully secure CP-ABE systems. We will
start with the most basic application of the dual system encryption method-
ology and present a full security proof for a CP-ABE scheme that holds under
the restriction that attributes are only used in the description of the access
6
policy. (For more details on the precise meaning of this restriction, see Chap-
ter 5.) Our proof relies only on the Decisional Linear Assumption. We also
describe an encoding technique that can be used to allow re-use of attributes,
though this may produce a significant loss in efficiency. This should be viewed
as a combination of the results we presented in [46, 48].
We next present a new scheme and accompanying proof of full security
that does not place any restriction on the use of attributes. The first two
schemes we present here shed light on the value of selective security as stepping
stone to full security for ABE schemes, as the constructions of the schemes
bear a very close resemblance to the selectively secure ABE constructions in
[39, 69], and the proof strategy for the second scheme directly incorporates
selective security proof techniques as building blocks that can be leveraged
within the dual system encryption methodology. In this way, we demonstrate
how dual system encryption can be viewed as a mechanism to “boost” selective
security to full security (though the details of the arguments must be adapted
to individual constructions). This result also appears in [53]. This approach
obtains much better efficiency, but comes at the cost of relying on a “q-type”
assumption (i.e. an assumption parameterized by a value depending on the
adversary’s behavior). This is a feature inherited from the state of the art
selectively secure CP-ABE scheme in [69].
In our first two CP-ABE constructions, private keys are issued by one
central authority that must be in a position to verify all the attributes or cre-
dentials it issues for each user in the system. However, in some applications a
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party will want to share data according to a policy written over attributes or
credentials issued across different trust domains and organizations. Motivated
by this, we next provide a multi-authority CP-ABE system. In our system,
any party can become an authority and there is no requirement for any global
coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common reference pa-
rameters. A party can simply act as an authority by creating a public key and
issuing private keys to different users that reflect their attributes. Different
authorities need not even be aware of each other. We use the concept of global
identifiers to link private keys together that were issued to the same user by
different authorities. A user can encrypt data according to access policies that
mix attributes issued from any chosen set of authorities. Most notably, our
decentralized system retains strong security guarantees while avoiding placing
absolute trust in any single designated entity. The decentralized nature of our
system gives rise to new technical challenges both in designing the construc-
tion and in proving security. We discuss these in detail when we present our
solution in Chapter 7. This should be viewed as a combination of the results
we presented in [46, 51].
1.3 Related Work
Identity-based encryption was first constructed by Boneh and Franklin
[14] and Cocks [25]. Both security proofs relied on the random oracle heuris-
tic. Constructions with proofs in the standard model were then presented by
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [20] and Boneh and Boyen [10], but these proofs
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provided only selective security.
The notion of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) was in-
troduced by Horwitz and Lynn [42]. In a HIBE system, user’s identities are
arranged in a hierarchy, and a superior can use his own secret key to issue a
secret key to any of his subordinates. Essentially, this extends the function-
ality of an IBE system to include key delegation. The first construction of
HIBE was provided by Gentry and Silverberg [36], who proved security in the
random oracle model. Selectively secure constructions in the standard model
were then given in the work of Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [20], Boneh and
Boyen [10], and Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [12].
Gentry [32] presented a security proof for an IBE system outside of the
partitioning paradigm, but at the cost of employing a non-standard complexity
assumption parameterized by the number of key queries made by the adversary
(a “q-type” assumption). These techniques were then extended by Gentry and
Halevi [34] to provide the first fully secure HIBE system to allow a hierarchy of
polynomial depth (the exponential degradation of prior full security reductions
limited the security proofs applicable to only constant depth hierarchies).
Chase [22] presented a “multi-authority” attribute-based encryption
scheme, allowing secret keys for different attributes to be dispensed by different
authorities. Her work introduced the concept of using a global identifier as
a mechanism for tying users’ keys together. Her system relied on a central
authority and was limited to expressing a strict“AND” policy over a pre-
determined set of authorities. Chase and Chow [23] showed how to remove
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the central authority using a distributed PRF; however, the same limitations
of an AND policy of a determined set of authorities remained.
Other forms of functional encryption have also been proposed. Most
notably, Katz, Sahai, and Waters proposed predicate encryption [44] and pre-
sented a selectively secure construction for inner product predicates. This is
a less expressive functionality than the access policies achieved for ABE, but
the goal of such systems is to provide security not only for the underlying
message, but also to hide the access policy itself, which is not a feature that
is considered in the ABE setting.
1.4 Organization
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the core concepts of the dual
system encryption methodology. In Chapter 3, we present tools for implement-
ing dual system encryption in the setting of prime order bilinear groups. In
Chapter 4, we provide background on single and multi-authority CP-ABE sys-
tems, giving formal definitions for their functionality and security. In Chapter
5, we construct our simplest CP-ABE scheme and prove its full security. In
Chapter 6, we provide a more efficient scheme and prove its full security. In
Chapter 7, we provide a multi-authority scheme and prove its full security. In
Chapter 8, we discuss additional work and further directions.
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Chapter 2
Conceptual Overview of Dual System
Encryption
Dual System Encryption is a proof methodology that we have designed
to address the inherent challenges in proving security for systems with ad-
vanced functionalities against collusion attacks. In the case of ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption, an adversary may gather secret keys for
many different users, each key corresponding to a set of attributes. We do
not want to allow the adversary to learn a message encrypted under an access
policy which is not satisfied by any of the individual keys he has collected. In
other words, a colluding set of malicious users should not be able to combine
their secret keys to decrypt a ciphertext that none of them are individually
authorized to decrypt. It is crucial to note that the union of all their attributes
might satisfy the policy, but as long as no single user does, the message should
remain protected. In this sense, we expect a secure CP-ABE scheme to enforce
that attributes are not transferable among users.
The formal definition of full security we employ for CP-ABE systems
is given in Chapter 4. We briefly summarize its relevant features for the
purposes of our discussion here. CP-ABE security is formulated as a game
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between a challenger and an attacker: the challenger sets up the CP-ABE
system and gives the attacker only the public parameters. The attacker then
adaptively queries the challenger for secret keys corresponding to attribute
sets of its choice. At some point, it declares two messages and an access policy
it wishes to be challenged on: this access policy must not be satisfied by any
of the individual keys it has collected so far. The challenger randomly chooses
one of the two declared messages and encrypts it under the declared access
policy. It gives the resulting ciphertext to the attacker. The attacker may then
continue to request keys, except for those authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
Finally, it must guess which of the two messages was encrypted. We say that
a system is secure when any polynomial time attacker guesses correctly only
with probability negligibly close to 1
2
.
As previously noted, this security definition places a heavy burden on
a reduction, as a simulator must both answer the attacker’s many key queries
and leverage the attacker’s success. Since trying to anticipate any structure
in the attacker’s queries appears to be a losing battle (unless one works in
the selective security model), dual system encryption is designed to prepare a
simulator to answer any key query. To explain how this can remain consistent
with the simulator’s ability to leverage the attacker’s success, we must first
describe the dual system encryption paradigm.
Normal and Semi-functional Ciphertexts/Keys In a dual system, there
are two forms of keys and ciphertexts: normal and semi-functional. Semi-
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functional ciphertexts and keys are not used in the real system, they are
only used in the security proof. A normal key can decrypt normal or semi-
functional ciphertexts, and a normal ciphertext can be decrypted by normal or
semi-functional keys. However, when a semi-functional key is used to decrypt
a semi-functional ciphertext, decryption fails (with high probability). More
specifically, the semi-functional components of the key and ciphertext will in-
teract to mask the blinding factor by an additional random term. Security for
dual systems is proved using a sequence of games which are shown to be indis-
tinguishable. The first game is the real security game (with normal ciphertext
and keys). In the next game, the ciphertext is semi-functional, while all the
keys are normal. For an attacker that makes Q key requests, games 1 through
Q follow. In game k, the first k keys are semi-functional while the remaining
keys are normal. In game Q, all the keys and the challenge ciphertext given to
the attacker are semi-functional. Hence none of the given keys are useful for
decrypting the challenge ciphertext. At this point, proving security becomes
relatively easy, as we have reduced the burden on the simulator who no longer
has to give out functioning keys and ciphertexts.
Nominal Semi-functionality The most critical step of the hybrid proof
is when a key turns semi-functional: at this point, we must leverage the fact
that the key is not authorized to decrypt the (now semi-functional) challenge
ciphertext in order to argue that the attacker cannot detect the change in the
key. However, since we are not imposing a partition on the simulator, there
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is no constraint preventing the simulator itself from creating a key that is
authorized to decrypt and testing the nature of the key for itself by attempting
to decrypt the semi-functional ciphertext. To resolve this potential paradox,
we design our system so that such a test decryption would unconditionally
succeed.
We introduce a variant of semi-functionality which we call nominal
semi-functionality. A nominal semi-functional key and ciphertext pair is semi-
functional in name only, meaning that they are individually distributed like
semi-functional keys, but are actually correlated to each other so that the
interaction of their semi-functional components results in cancelation during
decryption, and hence decryption remains successful. If the simulator attempts
to answer its own question by creating the kth key and challenge ciphertext
for an attribute set and access policy that is satisfied, the created pair will
be nominally semi-functional and hence test decrypting will not distinguish
the nature of the key. We note that the first introduction of dual system
encryption in [68] took the opposite approach, arranging for test decryptions
by the simulator to unconditionally fail by the use of “tags” that also caused
a negligible decryption error and other undesirable structural features. We
introduced the concept of nominal semi-functionality in [50] as a cleaner, more
flexible alternative to tags.
Of course, nominal semi-functionality is only useful as a stepping stone
to regular semi-functionality, since the primary goal is to arrive at a game
where the simulator is no longer burdened by the need to produce keys and
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ciphertexts that function properly together. One way of getting from nominal
semi-functionality to regular semi-functionality is via an information-theoretic
argument, leveraging the fact that the attacker is not allowed to ask for a key
that is authorized to decrypt the ciphertext. This is the path that we took
in the first works employing nominality and has been followed by all of the
works since [48–52, 60], except for our most recent work in [53]. The new path
we designed in [53] instead relies on a computational assumption to transition
from nominal semi-functionality to regular semi-functionality.
Structure of Semi-functional Space Before describing the main ideas
behind these two approaches, we first develop the high-level principles under-
pinning the design of semi-functional objects. We think of the normal keys
and ciphertexts as residing in a “normal space”, while semi-functional keys
and ciphertexts additionally have components in a “semi-functional space”.
These two spaces should be constructed so that normal components do not
interact with semi-functional components and vice versa - one should think of
the normal space and the semi-functional space as being “orthogonal” to each
other.
In essence, we will typically design the semi-functional components of
keys and ciphertexts to form a parallel copy of the normal system residing
in semi-functional space. The semi-functional copy of the system has the ad-
vantage of not being tied by public parameters, since the published public
parameters will only reside in the normal space. The phantom parameters
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in the semi-functional space (that are uncorrelated from the published pub-
lic parameters) can then be utilized in multiple ways. We first describe the
information-theoretic approach we introduced in [48, 50].
Information-theoretic Arguments for Hiding Nominality We imagine
for simplicity that the attacker makes only one key request. To produce a
ciphertext and key pair that is either semi-functional and normal respectively
or nominally semi-functional, the simulator will create a parallel copy of the
system in the semi-functional space. If semi-functional components are present
on the key, they will obey the proper distribution defined by the unpublished,
freshly random parameters in the semi-functional space and allow decryption
to succeed for an authorized key.
However, if one is given only a single ciphertext and a single unautho-
rized key, the additional randomness supplied by the unknown semi-functional
parameters can function to information-theoretically hide this correlation. Ar-
guing this in the CP-ABE setting leads one to make an additional restriction
that attributes are only used once in the LSSS matrices specifying access poli-
cies. This technical restriction is required to enforce that there is a fresh
random parameter available to hide each unauthorized share.
Since entropy here is a scarce resource, we also cannot afford for the
same semi-functional parameters to be involved in multiple keys. This is rather
easily handled by exploiting the hybrid organization of dual system encryption
arguments - since we turn one key semi-functional at a time, we can design a
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key isolation mechanism which allows us to limit the effect of some or all of
the relevant semi-functional space parameters to a single key at a time. In the
case of CP-ABE, we introduce two types of semi-functional keys to execute
this. Our techniques here exploit the structure of keys, which have a “header”
portion introducing the random values that tie the key together and then
have individual pieces corresponding to each attribute. When a key first turns
semi-functional, it will have semi-functional components on all of these pieces,
but then it will transition to having a random semi-functional component
only on the header portion. This means that information about the semi-
functional spaces attached to the attribute pieces is no longer leaked, thereby
preserving this entropy for use in turning the next key to be semi-functional.
We can conceptualize the semi-functional space attached to the header piece as
a “permanent” semi-functional space (where all semi-functional keys will have
components), and the semi-functional spaces attached to the attribute pieces
as “temporary” semi-functional spaces (where at most one semi-functional key
will have components at any point in the hybrid argument).
To adapt this same proof strategy to a multi-authority ABE scheme,
we face an additional technical challenge. Namely, we can no longer tie keys
together with common secret randomness, since the different pieces of the key
are produced by different authorities who do not coordinate. We will address
this by assuming users have global identifiers and introducing a hash function
(modeled as a random oracle) to map these identifiers to group elements.
These group elements can be computed by each authority and will form the
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common link between the different attributes in a user’s key. This requires
a re-design of our construction and our key isolation mechanism, since we no
longer have a header piece of each key to use as a structural linchpin and as a
storage location for permanent semi-functionality. Instead, we design the semi-
functional spaces attached to each piece of the key to have “permanent” and
“temporary” portions - when a key first becomes semi-functional, its semi-
functional components will reside only in the temporary portions of semi-
functional space, where the information-theoretic argument takes place. It
will then switch to having semi-functional components residing only in the
permanent portions of semi-functional space, thereby releasing the entropy
available in temporary semi-functional space to be used to hide nominality for
the next key as it becomes semi-functional.
Once we have full security proofs for systems where attributes can only
be used once in each access policy, we can extend this to systems allowing reuse
of attributes by setting a fixed bound M on the maximum number of times
an attribute may be used and having separate parameters for each use. This
scales the size of the public parameters by M , as well as the size of secret keys
for CP-ABE systems1. This approach may incur a significant loss in efficiency.
A New Computational Approach for Addressing Nominality Our
next observation is motivated by the intuition that the information-theoretic
step of the above dual system proof strategy is ceding too much ground to the
1For KP-ABE systems, it is the ciphertext size that will grow multiplicatively with M .
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attacker, since a computational argument would suffice. In fact, we are able
to resurrect the earlier selective proof techniques inside the framework of dual
system encryption in order to retake ground and obtain a wholly computational
proof of full security.
As we have discussed above, dual system encryption is typically imple-
mented by designing a “semi-functional space” where semi-functional compo-
nents of keys and ciphertexts will behave like a parallel copy of the normal
components of the system, except divorced from the public parameters. In-
stead of conceptualizing the initially hidden parameters in the semi-functional
space as a source of entropy, we now think of this as a mechanism for allow-
ing delayed parameters in the semi-functional space, meaning that relevant
variables can be defined later in the simulation instead of needing to be fixed
in the setup phase. We will still additionally use a mechanism for key isola-
tion, meaning that some or all of the semi-functional parameters will only be
relevant to the distribution of a single semi-functional key at a time.
In combination, these two mechanisms mean that the semi-functional
space has its own fresh parameters that can be decided on the fly by the
simulator when they become relevant, and they are only relevant for the semi-
functional ciphertext and a single semi-functional key. We now observe that
these mechanisms can be used to implement prior techniques for selective
security proofs, without needing to impose the selective restriction on the
attacker.
To explain this more precisely, we consider the critical step in the hy-
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brid security proof when a particular key becomes semi-functional. We concep-
tualize the unpublished semi-functional parameters as being defined belatedly
when the simulator first issues either the key in question or the semi-functional
ciphertext. If the ciphertext is issued first, then the simulator learns the chal-
lenge policy before defining the delayed semi-functional parameters - this is
closely analogous to the setting of selective security for a CP-ABE system. If
the key is issued first, then the simulator learns the relevant set of attributes
before defining the delayed semi-functional parameters, and this is closely anal-
ogous to the setting of selective security for a KP-ABE system. This provides
us with an opportunity to combine the techniques used to prove selective secu-
rity for both CP-ABE and KP-ABE systems with the dual system encryption
methodology in order to obtain a new proof of full security while maintaining
the efficiency of selectively secure systems.
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Chapter 3
Tools for Implementing the Dual System
Encryption Methodology in Prime Order
Bilinear Groups
We now build some general tools for implementing dual system en-
cryption proofs in the context of prime order bilinear groups. Bilinear groups
are a natural setting for CP-ABE systems and dual system encryption proofs,
since they come equipped with nice randomization properties that can be
used for collusion resistance and provide convenient instantiations of orthogo-
nal “spaces.” Constructing expressive CP-ABE systems or implementing dual
system encryption techniques in any other setting (lattices, for example), is
currently an open problem.
Composite order bilinear groups come equipped with prime order sub-
groups that are mutually orthogonal and thus can directly serve as orthogonal
spaces. This is why many of the first works using dual system encryption
worked in this setting. In this work, however, we instead use the dual pairing
vector space framework developed by Okamoto and Takashima to instantiate
our orthogonal spaces in prime order bilinear groups.
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3.1 Prime Order Bilinear Groups
We now let G denote a bilinear group of prime order p, with bilinear
map e : G × G → GT . More generally, one may have a bilinear map e :
G × H → GT , where G and H are different groups. For simplicity, we will
always consider groups where G = H.
In addition to referring to individual elements ofG, we will also consider
“vectors” of group elements. For v⃗ = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Znp and g ∈ G, we write
gv⃗ to denote a n-tuple of elements of G:
gv⃗ := (gv1 , gv2 , . . . , gvn).
We can also perform scalar multiplication and vector addition in the exponent.
For any a ∈ Zp and v⃗, w⃗ ∈ Znp , we have:
gav⃗ = (gav1 , . . . , gavn), gv⃗+w⃗ = (gv1+w1 , . . . , gvn+wn).
We define en to denote the product of the componentwise pairings (the product





e(gvi , gwi) = e(g, g)v⃗·w⃗.
Here, the dot product is taken modulo p.
Decisional Linear Assumption The main complexity assumption we will
rely on in prime order bilinear groups is the Decisional Linear Assumption,
introduced in [13]. To define this formally, we let G denote a group generation
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algorithm, which takes in a security parameter λ and outputs a bilinear group
G of order p. We write (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G to denote the generation of a group
by running G. Below, we also use the notation x
R←− S to denote a uniformly
random sample x taken from a finite set S.
Definition 1. Decisional Linear Assumption. Given a group generator G, we
define the following distribution:
G := (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G,
g, f, v
R←− G, c1, c2, w
R←− Zp,
D := (g, f, v, f c1 , vc2).
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
AdvG,A :=
∣∣Pr [A(D, gc1+c2) = 1]− Pr [A(D, gc1+c2+w) = 1]∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
3.2 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
We will employ the concept of dual pairing vector spaces from [58,
59]. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we will choose two random bases
B := (⃗b1, . . . , b⃗n) and B∗ := (⃗b∗1, . . . , b⃗∗n) of Znp , subject to the constraint that
they are “dual orthonormal”, meaning that
b⃗i · b⃗∗j = 0 (mod p),
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whenever i ̸= j, and
b⃗i · b⃗∗i = 1 (mod p)
for all i. (Some prior works have allowed b⃗i · b⃗∗i = ψ for ψ ̸= 1, but we restrict




j ) = 1
whenever i ̸= j, where 1 here denotes the identity element in GT .
We note that choosing random dual orthonormal bases (B,B∗) can
equivalently be thought of as choosing a random basis B, choosing a vec-
tor b⃗∗1 so that it is orthogonal to b⃗2, . . . , b⃗n and satisfies 1 = b⃗1 · b⃗∗1, and then
choosing b⃗∗2 so that it is orthogonal to b⃗1, b⃗3, . . . , b⃗n, and satisfies 1 = b⃗2 · b⃗∗2, and
so on. We will later use the notation (D,D∗) and d⃗1, . . . , etc. to also denote
dual orthonormal bases and their vectors. This is because we will sometimes
be handling more than one pair of dual orthonormal bases at a time, and we
use different notation to avoid confusing them.
By employing dual orthonormal bases (B,B∗) in the exponents of our
ciphertexts and keys respectively, we can naturally partition these basis vectors
into disjoint sets spanning the “normal space” and the “semi-functional space.”
For instance, for a bases pair of dimension 3, we may declare b⃗1, b⃗2 to span the
normal space on the ciphertext side and b⃗3 to span the semi-functional space
on the ciphertext side, while b⃗∗1, b⃗
∗
2 span the normal space on the key side and
b⃗∗3 spans the semi-functional space on the key side. We note that the normal
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space on the ciphertext side will be orthogonal to the semi-functional space
on the key side, and vice versa.
3.2.1 Parameter Hiding in Dual Orthonormal Bases
It will be crucial in our security proofs that when one publishes param-
eters for the normal space and produces normal keys, one only information-
theoretically reveals the bases vectors for the normal spaces, while some in-
formation about the remaining bases vectors for the semi-functional spaces
remains hidden.
More generally, we observe a mechanism for parameter hiding using
dual orthonormal bases: one can generate a random pair of dual orthonormal
bases (B,B∗) for Znp , apply an invertible change of basis matrix A to a subset of
these basis vectors, and produce a new pair of dual orthonormal bases which
is also randomly distributed, independently of A. This allows us to hide a
random matrix A. We formulate this precisely below.
We consider taking dual orthonormal bases and applying a linear change
of basis to a subset of their vectors. We do this in such a way that we produce
new dual orthonormal bases. In this subsection, we prove that if we start with
randomly sampled dual orthonormal bases, then the resulting bases will also
be random - in particular, the distribution of the final bases reveals nothing
about the change of basis matrix that was employed. This can be leveraged in
security proofs as a way of separating the simulator’s view from the attacker’s.
To describe this formally, we let m ≤ n be fixed positive integers and
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A ∈ Zm×mp be an invertible matrix. We let Sm ⊆ [n] be a subset of size m
(|S| = m). For any dual orthonormal bases B,B∗, we can then define new dual
orthonormal bases BA,B∗A as follows. We let Bm denote the n×m matrix over
Zp whose columns are the vectors b⃗i ∈ B such that i ∈ Sm. Then BmA is also
an n×m matrix. We form BA by retaining all of the vectors b⃗i ∈ B for i /∈ Sm
and exchanging the b⃗i for i ∈ Sm with the columns of BmA. To define B∗A,
we similarly let B∗m denote the n ×m matrix over Zp whose columns are the
vectors b⃗∗i ∈ B∗ such that i ∈ Sm. Then B∗m(A−1)t is also an n ×m matrix,
where (A−1)t denotes the transpose of A−1. We form B∗A by retaining all of the
vectors b⃗∗i ∈ B∗ for i /∈ Sm and exchanging the b⃗i for i ∈ Sm with the columns
of B∗m(A
−1)t.
To see that BA and B∗A are dual orthonormal bases, note that for i ∈ Sm,
the corresponding basis vector in BA can be expressed as a linear combination
of the basis vectors b⃗j ∈ B with j ∈ Sm, and the coefficients of this linear
combination correspond to a column of A, say the ℓth column (equivalently,
say i is the ℓth element of Sm). When ℓ ̸= ℓ′, the ℓth column of A is orthogonal
to the (ℓ′)th column of (A−1)t. This means that the ith vector of BA will
be orthogonal to the (i′)th vector of B∗A whenever i ̸= i′. Moreover, the ℓth
column of A and the ℓth column of (A−1)t have dot product equal to 1, so the
dot product of the ith vector of BA and the ith vector of B∗A will be equal to 1
as in the original bases B and B∗.
For a fixed dimension n and prime p, we let (B,B∗) R←− Dual(Znp ) de-
note choosing random dual orthonormal bases B and B∗ of Znp . Here, Dual(Znp )
26
denotes the set of dual orthonormal bases.
Lemma 2. For any fixed positive integers m ≤ n, any fixed invertible A ∈
Zm×mp and set Sm ⊆ [n] of size m, if (B,B∗)
R←− Dual(Znp ), then (BA,B∗A)
is also distributed as a random sample from Dual(Znp ). In particular, the
distribution of (BA,B∗A) is independent of A.
Proof. There is a one-to-one correspondence between (B,B∗) and (BA,B∗A):
given (BA,B∗A), one can recover (B,B∗) by applying A−1 to the vectors in BA
whose indices are in Sm, and applying A
t to the corresponding vectors in B∗A.
This shows that every pair of dual orthonormal bases is equally likely to occur
as BA,B∗A.
3.2.2 The Subspace Assumption
We now describe the “Subspace Assumption,” which is implied by the
decisional linear assumption. We introduced this in [46] to help clarify how
DLIN allows one to expand/contract spaces in the exponent in the dual pairing
vector space framework. It is based on the observation that if we fix a pair
(B,B∗) of dual orthonormal bases and one is given gv⃗ say, then one cannot tell
if v⃗ is in the span of b⃗∗1, b⃗
∗






3 when one is not given
gb⃗3 (though one can be given gw⃗ for w⃗ in the span of b⃗1, b⃗2, b⃗3, for example).
At its core, the subspace assumption translates the DLIN assumption into a
change from a 2-dimensional space in the exponent to a 3-dimensional one,
and then replicates this in parallel both within a bases pair and over many
bases pairs. In our security proofs, we will employ the subspace assumption
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to move ciphertext and key components in and out of various portions of the
semi-functional space. We will also use it to transition to the final security
game, where the semi-functional ciphertext becomes an encryption of a random
message.
The statement of the subspace assumption we give here is parameter-
ized by several values which can be set to be any positive integers. We let the
parameter m denote the number of pairs of dual orthonormal bases involved.
Each basis pair has its own dimension ni and its own parameter ki ≤ ni/3 (this
parameter describes how many 2-dimensional subspaces within each basis are
expanding to be 3-dimensional).
The Subspace Assumption will consider m bases pairs chosen indepen-
dently at random. These bases pairs will be denoted by (B1,B∗1), . . ., (Bm,B∗m),
and the vectors comprising each (Bi,B∗i ) will be denoted by b⃗1,i, . . . , b⃗ni,i and
b⃗∗1,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
ni,i
. For a simpler statement of the subspace assumption considering
only one bases pair, see [46]. Compared to the statement in [46], we have also
added a few extra terms that will be useful in the security proof for our multi-
authority CP-ABE system. We have also chosen to directly reveal the basis
vectors that are not involved in the expanding subspaces, whereas the original
statement in [46] left these in the exponent. This change is not necessary for
any of our proofs here, but we feel it is worthwhile to point out that giving out
these basis vectors directly does not affect the reduction from the decisional
linear assumption.
Definition 3. (The Subspace Assumption) Given a group generator G, we define
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the following distribution:
G := (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G, g R←− G, η, β, τ1, τ2, τ3, µ1, µ2, µ3
R←− Zp,
(B1,B∗1)
R←− Dual(Zn1p ), . . . , (Bm,B∗m)
R←− Dual(Znmp ),
U1,i := g
µ1b⃗1,i+µ2b⃗ki+1,i+µ3b⃗2ki+1,i , U2,i := g
µ1b⃗2,i+µ2b⃗ki+2,i+µ3b⃗2ki+2,i ,
. . . , Uki,i := g








. . . , Vki,i := g
τ1η⃗b∗ki,i










. . . , Wki,i := g
τ1ηb⃗∗ki,i
+τ2βb⃗∗2ki,i
+τ3b⃗∗3ki,i ∀i ∈ [m],
D :=
(
G, g, gη, gβ, gτ1η, gτ2β, {gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , . . . , gb⃗2ki,i , b⃗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗ni,i,
gηb⃗
∗








2ki+1,i , . . . , gb⃗
∗
3ki,i ,
b⃗∗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
ni,i
, U1,i, U2,i, . . . , Uki,i}mi=1, µ3
)
.
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
AdvG,A := |Pr [A (D, {V1,i, . . . , Vki,i}mi=1) = 1]− Pr [A (D, {W1,i, . . . ,Wki,i}mi=1) = 1]|
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
We have included in D more terms than will be necessary for many
applications of this assumption, and in what follows we will often omit those
we do not need. In our proofs below, we will also ignore that the final vectors
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are given directly and write all vectors as being given in the exponent for
notational simplicity, since this suffices for our purposes.
We will work exclusively with the k = 1 and k = 2 cases. To help
the reader see the main structure of this assumption through the burdensome
notation, we include heuristic illustrations of the m = 1, n = 3, k = 1 and










Figure 3.2: Subspace Assumption with m = 1, n = 6, k = 2
In these diagrams, the top rows illustrate the U terms, while the bottom
rows illustrate the V,W terms. The solid ovals and rectangles indicate the
presence of basis vectors. The crossed rectangles indicate basis elements of B
which are present in U1, U2 but are not given out in isolation. The dotted ovals
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adorned by question marks indicate the basis vectors whose presence depends
on whether we consider the V ’s or the W ’s.
We now prove:
Lemma 4. If the decisional linear assumption holds for a group generator G,
then the subspace assumption stated in Definition 3 also holds for G (for any
fixed values of m,n1 ≥ 3k1, . . . , nm ≥ 3km that are polynomial in the security
parameter).
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT algorithm A breaking the subspace
assumption with non-negligible advantage (for some fixed positive integers
m,n1, . . . , nm, k1, . . . , km satisfying n1 ≥ 3k1, . . . , nm ≥ 3km). We create a
PPT algorithm B which breaks the decisional linear assumption with non-
negligible advantage. B is given g, f, v, f c1 , vc2 , T , where T is either gc1+c2
or T = gc1+c2+w is a uniformly random element of G. We let ℓf denote the
discrete logarithm base g of f and ℓv denote the discrete logarithm base g of
v, i.e. f = gℓf and v = gℓv .
B simulates the subspace assumption for A as follows. B first (inde-
pendently) samples random dual orthonormal bases (D1,D∗1) ∈ Dual(Zn1p ),
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example. We note that B can produce gη = f and gβ = v.
B sets the dual basis as:
b⃗1,i = d⃗1,i, b⃗2,i = d⃗2,i, . . . , b⃗2ki,i = d⃗2ki,i,
b⃗2ki+1,i = d⃗2ki+1,i − ℓ−1f d⃗1,i − ℓ
−1
v d⃗ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗3ki,i = d⃗3ki,i − ℓ−1f d⃗ki,i − ℓ
−1
v d⃗2ki,i,
b⃗3ki+1,i = d⃗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗ni,i = d⃗ni,i.
We note that each pair (B1,B∗1), . . . , (Bm,B∗m) is indeed a pair of dual
orthonormal bases. We also note that B can produce all of gηb⃗
∗









2ki+1,i , . . . , gb⃗
∗
3ki,i , b⃗∗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
ni,i
, gb⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗2ki,i , and b⃗3ki+1,i,
. . ., b⃗ni,i for each i from 1 to m, but cannot produce g
b⃗2ki+1,i , . . . , gb⃗3ki,i .
We now observe that η = ℓf , β = ℓv, {⃗b1,i, . . . , b⃗ni,i} and {⃗b∗1,i, . . . , b⃗∗ni,i}
are properly distributed. Indeed, this follows from the fact that ℓf , ℓv are
randomly distributed and from Lemma 2, since we have applied a change of
basis to each (Di,D∗i ).
















































3. We note that these values are uniformly random, and µ3 is known












B then implicitly sets τ1 = c1 and τ2 = c2. This allows B to produce
































The terms which are multiples of c1ℓf and c2ℓv are not difficult for B to produce
as exponents of g, since B has f c1 = gc1ℓf and vc2 = gc2ℓv . For the multiples
of c1 + c2, B needs to use T .












If T = gc1+c2 , then these are distributed as V1,i, . . . , Vki,i. If T = g
c1+c2+w, then




g, gη, gβ, gητ1 , gβτ2 , {gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , . . . , gb⃗2ki,i , b⃗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗ni,i, gηb⃗
∗









2ki+1,i , . . . , gb⃗
∗
3ki,i , b⃗∗3ki+1,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
ni,i
, U1,i, U2,i, . . . , Uki,i}mi=1, µ3
)
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to A, along with {T1,i . . . , Tki,i}mi=1. B can then leverage A’s non-negligible ad-
vantage in distinguishing between the distributions {V1,i, . . . , Vki,i} and {W1,i,
. . ., Wki,i} to achieve a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing T = gc1+c2
from T = gc1+c2+w, violating the decisional linear assumption.
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Chapter 4
Background on CP-ABE Systems
In this section, we give required background material on access struc-
tures, the formal definition of a CP-ABE scheme, and the security definition
we will use. We also present the formal definitions for multi-authority CP-ABE
schemes.
4.1 Access Structures
Definition 5. (Access Structure [7]) Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties. A
collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈
A. An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {P1, . . . , Pn},
i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the
sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
In our setting, attributes will play the role of parties and we will con-
sider only monotone access structures. One can (somewhat inefficiently) real-
ize general access structures with our techniques by having the negation of an
attribute be a separate attribute (so the total number of attributes doubles).
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Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes Our constructions will employ linear secret-
sharing schemes (LSSS). We use the following definition adapted from [7].
Definition 6. (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)) A secret sharing scheme
Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix A called the share-generating matrix for Π. The
matrix A has ℓ rows and n columns. For all j = 1, . . . , ℓ, the jth row of
A is labeled by a party ρ(j) (ρ is a function from {1, . . . , ℓ} to P). When
we consider the column vector v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the
secret to be shared and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then Av is
the vector of ℓ shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Av)j
belongs to party ρ(j).
We note the linear reconstruction property: we suppose that Π is an
LSSS for access structure A. We let S denote an authorized set, and define
I ⊆ {1, . . . , ℓ} as I = {j|ρ(j) ∈ S}. Then the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span
of rows of A indexed by I, and there exist constants {ωj ∈ Zp}j∈I such that,
for any valid shares {λj} of a secret s according to Π, we have:
∑
j∈I ωjλj = s.
These constants {ωj} can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-
generating matrix A [7]. For unauthorized sets, no such constants {ωj} exist.
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4.2 CP-ABE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system consists of four
algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
Setup(λ,U) → (PP,MSK) The setup algorithm takes in the security pa-
rameter λ and the attribute universe description U. It outputs the public
parameters PP and a master secret key MSK.
Encrypt(PP,M,A) → CT The encryption algorithm takes in the public
parameters PP, the message M , and an access structure A over the universe
of attributes. It will output a ciphertext CT such that only users whose private
keys satisfy the access structure A should be able to extract M . We assume
that A is implicitly included in CT.
KeyGen(MSK,PP, S) → SK The key generation algorithm takes in the
master secret key MSK, the public parameters PP, and a set of attributes S.
It outputs a private key SK. We assume that S is implicitly included in SK.
Decrypt(PP,CT, SK) → M The decryption algorithm takes in the public
parameters PP, a ciphertext CT, and a private key SK. If the set of attributes
of the private key satisfies the access structure of the ciphertext, it outputs
the message M .
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Definition 7. A CP-ABE system is said to be correct if whenever PP,MSK are
obtained by running the setup algorithm, CT is obtained by running the en-
cryption algorithm on PP,M,A, SK is obtained by running the key generation
algorithm on MSK,PP, S and S satisfies A, then Decrypt(PP,CT, SK) =M .
4.3 Security Model for CP-ABE
We now give the full security definition for CP-ABE systems. This is
described by a game between a challenger and an attacker. The game proceeds
as follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and sends the public param-
eters PP to the attacker.
Phase 1 The attacker adaptively queries the challenger for private keys cor-
responding to sets of attributes S1, . . . , SQ1 . Each time, the challenger re-
sponds with a secret key SKk obtained by running KeyGen(MSK,PP, Sk).
Challenge The attacker declares two equal length messages M0 and M1
and an access structure A. This access structure cannot be satisfied by any
of the queried attribute sets S1, . . . , SQ1 . The challenger flips a random coin
b ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mb under A, producing CT. It sends CT to the
attacker.
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Phase 2 The attacker adaptively queries the challenger for private keys cor-
responding to sets of attributes SQ1+1, . . . , SQ, with the added restriction that
none of these satisfy A. Each time, the challenger responds with a secret key
SKk obtained by running KeyGen(MSK,PP, Sk).
Guess The attacker outputs a guess b′ for b.
The advantage of an attacker in this game is defined to be Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
.
Definition 8. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is fully
secure if all polynomial time attackers have at most a negligible advantage in
this security game.
Selective security is defined by adding an initialization phase where the
attacker must declare A before seeing PP.
4.4 Formal Definitions for Multi-Authority CP-ABE Sys-
tems
We now present formal definitions for multi-authority CP-ABE sys-
tems and their security. A multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption system is comprised of the following five algorithms:
Global Setup(λ) → GP The global setup algorithm takes in the security
parameter λ and outputs global parameters GP for the system.
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Authority Setup(GP)→ SK,PK Each authority runs the authority setup
algorithm with GP as input to produce its own secret key and public key pair,
SK,PK.
Encrypt(M,A,GP, {PK})→ CT The encryption algorithm takes in a mes-
sage M , an access structure A, the set of public keys for relevant authorities,
and the global parameters. It outputs a ciphertext CT.
KeyGen(GID,GP, i, SK) → Ki,GID The key generation algorithm takes in
an identity GID, the global parameters, an attribute i belonging to some
authority, and the secret key SK for this authority. It produces a key Ki,GID
for this attribute, identity pair.
Decrypt(CT,GP, {PK}, {Ki,GID})→M The decryption algorithm takes in
a ciphertext, the global parameters, the public keys for the relevant authorities,
and a collection of keys corresponding to attribute, identity pairs all with the
same fixed identity GID. It outputs the message M when the collection of
attributes i satisfies the access structure corresponding to the ciphertext.
Definition 9. A multi-authority CP-ABE system is said to be correct if when-
ever GP is obtained from the global setup algorithm, {PK, SK} are obtained
by running the authority setup algorithm, CT is obtained from the encryption
algorithm on the message M using the public keys {PK}, and {Ki,GID} is a
set of keys obtained from running the key generation algorithms with {SK} for
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the same identity GID and for a set of attributes satisfying the access structure
of the ciphertext, Decrypt(CT,GP, {PK}, {Ki,GID}) =M .
4.4.1 Security Definition
We define security for multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption systems by the following game between a challenger and an at-
tacker. We assume that adversaries can corrupt authorities only statically,
but key queries are made adaptively. A static corruption model is also used
by Chase [22] and Chase and Chow [23], but we note that our model addition-
ally allows the adversary to choose the public keys of the corrupted authorities
for itself, instead of having these initially generated by the challenger.
We let S denote the set of authorities and U denote the universe of
attributes. We assume each attribute is assigned to one authority (though
each authority may control multiple attributes). In practice, we can think of
an attribute as being the concatenation of an authority’s public key and a
string attribute. This will ensure that if multiple authorities choose the same
string attribute, these will still correspond to distinct attributes in the system.
Setup The global setup algorithm is run. The attacker specifies a set S′ ⊆
S of corrupt authorities. For good (non-corrupt) authorities in S − S′, the
challenger obtains public key, private key pairs by running the authority setup
algorithm, and gives the public keys to the attacker.
41
Key Query Phase 1 The attacker makes key queries by submitting pairs
(i,GID) to the challenger, where i is an attribute belonging to a good authority
and GID is an identity. The challenger responds by running the key generation
algorithm and giving the attacker the resulting key, Ki,GID.
Challenge Phase The attacker must specify two equal length messages,
M0,M1, and an access structure A. The access structure must satisfy the fol-
lowing constraint. For each identity GID, the union of the requested attributes
and all attributes controlled by the corrupt authorities must fail to satisfy A.
(In other words, the attacker cannot ask for a set of keys for one identity that
allow decryption in combination with any keys that can obtained from corrupt
authorities.) The attacker must also give the challenger the public keys for any
corrupt authorities whose attributes appear in the access structure. The chal-
lenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sends the attacker an encryption of
Mb under access structure A (obtained by running the encryption algorithm).
Key Query Phase 2 The attacker may submit additional key queries (i,GID),
as long as they do not violate the constraint on the challenge access structure.
Guess The attacker must submit a guess b′ for b. The attacker wins if b = b′.
The attacker’s advantage in this game is defined to be Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
.
Definition 10. A multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion system is secure (against static corruption of authorities) if all polynomial
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time attackers have at most a negligible advantage in this security game.
There are a few ways in which one might alter this security definition.
One could extend the definition to allow adaptive corruption of authorities,
for example, instead of requiring that all corrupt authorities be declared up
front. We will not address such extensions in this work.
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Chapter 5
A Basic CP-ABE System
We now present our core CP-ABE scheme, which inherits its main
structure from the selectively secure scheme of Waters [69]. In [48], we ob-
served that by simply embedding the selectively secure CP-ABE and KP-ABE
schemes of [39, 69] into composite order bilinear groups, we obtain schemes
that can be proven fully secure using the dual system encryption methodol-
ogy. The scheme we present here can be viewed as an analog of the schemes of
[48, 69] in the dual pairing vector space (DPVS) framework in prime order bi-
linear groups. Since the more general scheme in [60] is also an analog of these
schemes in the DPVS framework, it is naturally very closely related to the
construction we give here. For those familiar with these results, our construc-
tion and proof in this section is best conceptualized as a DPVS translation
of our composite-order construction and proof in [48], using the translation
techniques we developed in [46].
The genealogy of all these schemes should be viewed as a compelling
demonstration of the value of the selective security model as a vehicle for
inciting further progress, as the core construction techniques first presented in
selectively secure schemes have outlived selectivity and served as a foundation
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for fully secure systems. Historically, the progress of proof techniques lagged
behind the insights of construction designs, but our new proof methodology
can be interpreted as validating the partial progress achieved by selectively
secure constructions.
The intuition behind the core of the construction is rather elegant.
We work in a bilinear group, where key elements and ciphertext elements
can be paired together to cancel the effects of interaction between random
exponents chosen independently during encryption and key generation. To
prevent collusion attacks, individual secret keys are tied together by user-
specific random values that are intertwined with elements of the master secret
key as well as being attached to each attribute. To enforce the access policy
of the ciphertext, the encryptor chooses a random secret to be split into linear
shares in the exponent of a bilinear group. The secret itself blinds the message,
while the individual shares are also given out, each blinded by terms specific
to the associated attribute.
The first step of the decryption process transfers the goal of recovering
a fixed blinding factor into a “local” goal of recovering a value that involves
both the ciphertext secret and the user-specific randomness introduced by the
key. To achieve this localized goal, the user must “unblind” individual shares
of the ciphertext secret, which it should only be able to accomplish when it
has the corresponding attribute pieces in its secret key to pair the shares with.
Since we are working with the DPVS framework and will prove secu-
rity under the decisional linear assumption, it is convenient to duplicate the
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ciphertext secret as two parts (called s1 and s2 below) and to duplicate the key
randomness as well (called t1 and t2 below). This is because the decisional lin-
ear assumption allows us to expand from two-dimensional to three-dimensional
spaces in the exponent (as described in the previous section), so we start with
two-dimensional randomness.
5.1 Construction
We will work with a bilinear group G, and we will assume that mes-
sages to be encrypted are elements of the target group GT . We will allow
linear secret sharing schemes, represented by access matrices (A, ρ), as access
structures. We will assume that the size of the attribute universe is polyno-
mial in the security parameter (this is known as “small universe” ABE). We
conflate notation to let U denote the size of the attribute universe. In other
words, the attribute universe is assumed to be {1, 2, . . . ,U}.
Setup(λ,U) → PP,MSK The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G
of prime order p and a generator g. It randomly chooses one pair of dual
orthonormal bases (B,B∗) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual orthonormal
bases (B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) of dimension 6. We let b⃗i, b⃗∗i denote the basis
vectors belonging to (B,B∗), and b⃗i,j, b⃗∗i,j denote the basis vectors belong to
(Bj,B∗j) for each j from 1 to U. The setup algorithm also chooses two random
exponents α1, α2 ∈ Zp. The public parameters consist of:
PP := {G, p, gb⃗1 , gb⃗2 , gb⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗4,i ∀i ∈ [U], e(g, g)α1 , e(g, g)α2}.
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The master secret key additionally contains:
MSK := {gα1b⃗∗1 , gα2b⃗∗2 , gb⃗∗1 , gb⃗∗2 , gb⃗∗1,i , . . . , gb⃗∗4,i ∀i ∈ [U] }.
KeyGen(MSK, S,PP)→ SK The key generation algorithm chooses random
exponents t1, t2 ∈ Zp and computes:












4,i ∀i ∈ S.
The secret key is (it additionally includes S):
SK := {K, {Ki}i∈S}.
Encrypt((A, ρ),PP,M) → CT We assume M ∈ GT . We let ℓ × n denote
the dimensions of the matrix A and we recall that ρ is map from each row Aj
of A to an attribute ρ(j) (the index j ranges from 1 to ℓ). The encryption
algorithm chooses random exponents s1, s2, {r1j , r2j}ℓj=1 ∈ Zp. It also chooses
random vectors v1, v2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to s1 and s2 respectively.
The ciphertext is formed as (it additionally includes (A, ρ)):
M ′ :=Me(g, g)α1s1e(g, g)α2s2 , C := gs1b⃗1+s2b⃗2 ,
Cj := g
(Aj ·v1+r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j)−r1j b⃗2,ρ(j)+(Aj ·v2+r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j)−r2j b⃗4,ρ(j) ∀j = 1, . . . , ℓ.
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Decrypt(CT,PP, SK)→ M The decryption algorithm computes constants
ωj ∈ Zp such that
∑








The message is recovered as:
M =M ′X/Y.
Correctness We observe that for each j,











ρ(j)∈S ωjAj ·v2) = e(g, g)(t1s1+t2s2).
We note that
Y = e(g, g)(s1(α1+t1)+s2(α2+t2)),
and therefore:
M ′X/Y =Me(g, g)(s1α1+s2α2)e(g, g)(t1s1+t2s2)/e(g, g)(s1(α1+t1)+s2(α2+t2)) =M.
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5.2 Addressing Re-use of Attributes
We will give a security proof for the CP-ABE system above under what
we call the one-use restriction. This means that the LSSS matrices used for the
ciphertexts may only refer to a particular attribute once. In other words, the
row-labeling function ρ must be injective. One way to address this limitation
is to provide a general transformation from a scheme that is fully secure under
this one-use restriction to a scheme that is fully secure when attributes are
reused. This can be done with a simple encoding technique, as we previously
observed in [48].
Suppose we have a CP-ABE system with a universe of U attributes
with LSSS access structures that is secure when the function ρ is injective for
each access structure associated to a ciphertext. Suppose we would like to
have a system with U attributes where attributes can be used ≤ k times in the
row labeling of a share-generating matrix. We can realize this by essentially
taking k copies of each attribute in the system: instead of a single attribute
B, we will have new “attributes” B : 1, . . . , B : k. Each time we want to label
a row of an access matrix A with B, we label it with B : i for a new value of
i. We let ρ denote the original row labeling of A and ρ′ denote this new row
labeling. Each time we want to associate a subset S of attributes to a key, we
instead use S ′ := {B : 1, . . . , B : k|B ∈ S}. We can then employ the one-use
system on the new universe of kU attributes and retain its full security. We
note that the set S ′ satisfies the access structure (A, ρ′) if and only if the set
S satisfies the access structure (A, ρ).
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For our construction, the sizes of the public parameters and the secret
keys grow linearly in the number of involved attributes, so these will expand
by a factor of k under this transformation. Note that the size of the access
matrix does not change, so ciphertexts in our construction will remain the
same size.
Remark 11. In the next section, we will present an alternate proof strategy
that allows us to prove full security directly without the one-use restriction,
thus avoiding the need to set such a parameter k and the resulting efficiency
costs incurred by this encoding. The trade-off will be the need for a q-type
assumption (whose size depends on the behavior of the attacker). The security
proof we give here under the one-use restriction relies only on the decisional
linear assumption.
5.3 Security Proof Under the One-Use Restriction
We will now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 12. Under the decisional linear assumption, the CP-ABE scheme
presented in Section 5.1 is fully secure in the sense of Definition 8 when access
matrices (A, ρ) are required to have injective row labeling functions ρ.
We begin by defining our various types of semi-functional keys and
ciphertexts. The semi-functional space in the exponent will correspond to the
span of b⃗3, b⃗
∗






Semi-functional Keys To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute
set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal
key consisting of K, {Ki}i∈S. One then chooses a random value γ ∈ Zp and
multiplies K by gγb⃗
∗
3 . The other components of the key remain unchanged.
Semi-functional Ciphertexts To produce a semi-functional ciphertext for
an LSSS matrix (A, ρ), one first calls the normal encryption algorithm to pro-
duce a normal ciphertext consisting of M ′, C, {Cj}. One then chooses random
values s3, {r3j} ∈ Zp and a random vector v3 ∈ Znp with first entry equal to s3.
The semi-functional ciphertext is:
M ′, Cgs3b⃗3 , Cjg
(Aj ·v3+r3j )⃗b5,ρ(j)−r3j b⃗6,ρ(j) ∀j = 1, . . . , ℓ.
Temporary Semi-functional Keys To produce a temporary semi-functional
key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm
to produce a normal key consisting of K, {Ki}i∈S. One then chooses random






6,i ∀i ∈ S.
Remark 13. Nominal semi-functionality will occur when t3 = γ: in this case,
a temporary semi-functional key will successfully decrypt a semi-functional
ciphertext. This occurrence should be viewed as a correlation between the
semi-functional ciphertext and the temporary semi-functional key, even though
we semantically define it as a property of the coefficients in the key’s semi-
functional space. The correlation is realized through the dual orthonormal
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bases. Note that b⃗3 only appears in the semi-functional ciphertext, and without
setting b⃗3, there is ambiguity in the value of b⃗
∗
3 (and hence in its coefficient in
the key).
The purpose of a temporary semi-functional key is to accomplish the
transition from nominal semi-functionality to regular semi-functionality via an
information-theoretic argument. This argument will leverage the ambiguity in
the choice of the b⃗5,ρ(j), b⃗6,ρ(j) vectors for attributes ρ(j) that do not appear in
the key. This argument relies on the one-use restriction, as well as the fact
that only a single key will be a temporary semi-functional key at a time.
Our security proof will proceed as a hybrid argument over a sequence
of games. We let Gamereal denote the real security game and we let Q denote
the number of key queries made by the adversary. For each k from 0 to Q, we
define the following additional games:
Gamek This is like the real security game except that the challenge cipher-
text given to the adversary is semi-functional, the first k keys given to the
adversary are semi-functional, and the remaining keys are normal.
GameTk This is like Gamek, except that the k
th key given to the adversary
is a temporary semi-functional key. The first k − 1 keys are semi-functional,
and the remaining keys are normal.
Our hybrid argument begins with Gamereal, and then we transition
to Game0. For each k, we transition from Gamek to Game
T
k+1 and then to
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Gamek+1. Finally, we transition from GameQ (where everything given to the
adversary is semi-functional) to Gamefinal, which is like GameQ except that
the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message.
In this final game, the adversary has advantage 0, since everything it receives
is independent of the bit that it must guess. Our proof is accomplished in the
following lemmas.
Lemma 14. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamereal and Game0.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in ad-
vantage between Gamereal and Game0, we will create a PPT algorithm B to
break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with
parameters m = U + 1, ni = 3, ki = 1 for one value of i, and ni = 6, ki = 2
for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the as-
sumption with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we
will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (D,D∗) ∈ Dual(Z3p) and
(D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is given (we will ignore the U terms, gη,
gβ, gητ1 , gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be needed):







3 , {gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
T1, {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].











3. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms T1,i, T2,i
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6,i respectively. It is B’s
task to determine if these τ3 contributions are present or not.
B implicitly sets the bases for the construction as:
b⃗1 = ηd⃗
∗
1, b⃗2 = βd⃗
∗













1,i, b⃗2,i = ηd⃗
∗
2,i, b⃗3,i = βd⃗
∗
3,i, b⃗4,i = βd⃗
∗
4,i, b⃗5,i = d⃗
∗















5,i = d⃗5,i, b⃗
∗
6,i = d⃗6,i ∀i.
We note that these are properly distributed because (D,D∗), (D1,D∗1), etc. are
randomly chosen.
B can use the terms given in the assumption to produce gb⃗1 , gb⃗2 ,
{gb⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗4,i} for the public parameters. B chooses random values α̃1, α̃2 ∈
















B gives the public parameters to A.
To produce a normal key for an attribute set S, B proceeds as follows.
It chooses random values t̃1, t̃2 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t1 = ηt̃1 and t2 = βt̃2.
It forms the key as:






























To produce the challenge ciphertext for an access matrix (A, ρ) of size
ℓ×n, B implicitly sets s1 = τ1 and s2 = τ2. It chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp
with first entry equal to 1. It also chooses random vectors ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with
first entries equal to 0. It will implicitly set v1 = s1v + ṽ1 and v2 = s2v + ṽ2.
We note that these are properly distributed as independent, random vectors
with first entries equal to s1 and s2 respectively. For each j from 1 to ℓ, B




j ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets r1j = r̃3j τ1 + r̃1j ,
r2j = r̃
3
j τ2 + r̃
2
j . We note that these values are properly distributed because
r̃1j , r̃
2
j are random. The ciphertext is formed as:



























for all j from 1 to ℓ.
If the exponents of the T terms do not include the τ3 terms, then the
exponent vector of C is s1⃗b1 + s2⃗b2 and the exponent vector of each Cj is:
= (Aj · τ1v + Aj · ṽ1 + τ1r̃3j + r̃1j )ηd⃗∗1,ρ(j) + (−τ1r̃3j − r̃1j )ηd⃗∗2,ρ(j)
+(Aj · τ2v + Aj · ṽ2 + τ2r̃3j + r̃2j )βd⃗∗3,ρ(j) + (−τ2r̃3j − r̃2j )βd⃗∗4,ρ(j)
= (Aj · v1 + r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j) − r1j b⃗2,ρ(j) + (Aj · v2 + r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j) − r2j b⃗4,ρ(j).
Thus we have a properly distributed normal ciphertext in this case.
If the exponents of the T terms do include the τ3 terms, then the
exponent vector of C is s1⃗b1 + s2⃗b2 + s3⃗b3, where s3 := τ3 and the exponent
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vector of each Cj is:
(Aj · v1 + r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j) − r1j b⃗2,ρ(j) + (Aj · v2 + r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j) − r2j b⃗4,ρ(j)
+(Aj · v + r̃3j )τ3⃗b5,ρ(j) − r̃3j τ3⃗b6,ρ(j).
This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext with v3 = τ3v and
r3j = τ3r̃
j
3. (Note that these values are distributed randomly and independently





Thus, when the τ3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Gamereal,
and when the τ3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game0. As a result,
B can leverage A’s non-negligible difference in advantage between these games
to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Lemma 15. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamek−1 and Game
T
k
for any k from 1 to Q.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advan-
tage between Gamek−1 and Game
T
k for some k, we will create a PPT algorithm
B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption
with parameters m = U+1, ni = 3, ki = 1 for one value of i, and ni = 6, ki = 2
for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assump-
tion with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we
will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (B,B∗) ∈ Dual(Z3p) and
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(B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is given (we will ignore µ3, gβ, gη, gητ1 ,
and gβτ2 because they will not be needed):







3 , {gη⃗b∗1,i , gηb⃗∗2,i , gβb⃗∗3,i , gβb⃗∗4,i , gb⃗∗5,i , gb⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
U1 = g
µ1b⃗1+µ2b⃗2+µ3b⃗3 ,
{U1,i = gµ1b⃗1,i+µ2b⃗3,i+µ3b⃗5,i , U2,i = gµ1b⃗2,i+µ2b⃗4,i+µ3b⃗6,i}i∈[U],
T1, {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].











3. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms T1,i, T2,i





















6,i respectively. It is B’s task
to determine if these τ3 contributions are present or not.
B implicitly sets (B,B∗), {(Bi,B∗i )} as the bases for the construction.
It chooses random values α̃1, α̃2 ∈ Zp and implicitly sets α1 = ηα̃1 and α2 =








2)α̃2 . B can thus produce the public parameters, and it gives these
to A.
To respond to A’s first k−1 key queries, B acts as follows. To produce
a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, it chooses random values t̃1, t̃2, γ ∈


































In this way, B produces properly distributed semi-functional keys in response
to the first k − 1 key requests. We note that B can similarly produce normal
keys in response to key requests k + 1 and onward using the same procedure
except leaving off gγb⃗
∗
3 from K.
To create the kth key for some attribute set S, B proceeds as follows.












Ki = T1,iT2,i ∀i ∈ S.
If the exponents of the T terms here do not include the τ3 terms, then this is
a properly distributed normal key. If they do include the τ3 terms, then this
is a temporary semi-functional key with γ = t3 = τ3. (In other words, the
simulator is producing a nominal semi-functional key.)
To create the semi-functional ciphertext for some n × ℓ access matrix




j ∈ Zp for each j from 1 to ℓ. It also
chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to 1, and random vectors
ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to 0. It implicitly sets s1 = µ1, s2 = µ2,













and r3j = µ3r̃
3
j . We note that these values are properly distributed. The
ciphertext is formed as:
M ′ =Mbe3(U1, g
ηb⃗∗1)α̃1e3(U1, g

















for all j from 1 to ℓ.
Now we must argue that in A’s view, the kth key is properly distributed
as a temporary semi-functional key (i.e. nominality is hidden). In other words,
we must argue that the correlation γ = t3 that is present in B’s view is
information-theoretically hidden from A. To see this, we consider the values
of j ∈ [ℓ] in the ciphertext for which ρ(j) is not in the attribute set S for the
kth key. For these attributes, the corresponding basis vectors b⃗∗5,ρ(j), b⃗
∗
6,ρ(j) for
the semi-functional space on the key side are never revealed to A, as they are
not involved in any of the keys that A receives. This means that the ciphertext
exponent vector (Aj ·s3v+r3j )⃗b5,ρ(j)−r3j b⃗6,ρ(j) is distributed independently of the
share value, Aj · s3v. This is because when b⃗∗5,ρ(j), b⃗∗6,ρ(j) are not revealed, there
is ambiguity as to what b⃗5,ρ(j) and b⃗6,ρ(j) are - in particular, for any possible
choices of b⃗5,ρ(j) and b⃗6,ρ(j), multiplying each by arbitrary scalars yields an
alternate choice that is equally likely in A’s view (this is a particular case of
Lemma 2). Thus, no information about Aj · s3v can be learned for the values
of j such that ρ(j) /∈ S. It is important to note here that we are relying on
the restriction that ρ is an injective map from rows to attributes - if the same
bases vectors b⃗5,ρ(j), b⃗6,ρ(j) appeared repeatedly, then they would not provide
fresh randomness to hide each share value.
We then observe that if one only has the values of Aj ·s3v for j such that
ρ(j) ∈ S, then these shares reveal no information about s3, since they do not
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correspond to a satisfying set. More precisely, the fact that S does not satisfy
the access matrix implies that there exists some vector w ∈ Znp such that w’s
first entry is 1 and w is orthogonal modulo p to all of the rows Aj such that
ρ(j) ∈ S. Then s3v can be written as s3w + v′, where v′ has first coordinate
equal to 0 and is distributed independently of s3. Since the distribution of the
shares Aj · s3v for ρ(j) in S then only depends on v′ and not on s3, s3 remains
information-theoretically hidden.
Thus, only the distribution of C in the challenge ciphertext depends
on s3: this means that only a random multiple of b⃗3 is revealed, and hence
t3⃗b
∗
3 is distributed as a random multiple of b⃗
∗
3, even though t3 is not random.
The randomness here comes from the ambiguity in the choice of b⃗3, b⃗
∗
3: for any
possible choice of these vectors, multiplying one by any nonzero scalar σ and
the other by σ−1 yields an equally likely choice.
Thus, when the τ3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Gamek−1,
and when the τ3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game
T
k . As a result,
B can leverage A’s non-negligible difference in advantage between these games
to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Lemma 16. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between GameTk and Gamek
for any k from 1 to Q.
Proof. This is nearly identical to the proof of the previous lemma, except that
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the simulator B will choose a random γ̃ ∈ Zp and multiply (gb⃗
∗
3)γ̃ into K
when creating the kth key. This ensures that this key is properly distributed
as a temporary semi-functional key when the τ3 terms are present and prop-
erly distributed as a semi-functional key when they are not. Note that the
information-theoretic argument made in the previous proof is no longer needed
here.
Lemma 17. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between GameQ and Gamefinal.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in ad-
vantage between GameQ and Gamefinal, we will create a PPT algorithm B to
break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with
parameters m = U+ 1, ni = 3, ki = 1 for one value of i, and ni = 6, ki = 2 for
the rest of the values of i. To coincide with our notation for the construction,
we will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (B,B∗) ∈ Dual(Z3p)
and (B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is given (we will ignore µ3, gη, gβ,
gητ1 , gβτ2 , and {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U] because they will not be needed):







3 , {gη⃗b∗1,i , gηb⃗∗2,i , gβb⃗∗3,i , gβb⃗∗4,i , gb⃗∗5,i , gb⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
U1 = g
µ1b⃗1+µ2b⃗2+µ3b⃗3 ,
{U1,i = gµ1b⃗1,i+µ2b⃗3,i+µ3b⃗5,i , U2,i = gµ1b⃗2,i+µ2b⃗4,i+µ3b⃗6,i}i∈[U], T1.
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3. It is B’s task to determine if this τ3 contribution is
present or not.
B sets (B,B∗), {(Bi,B∗i )} as the bases for the construction. It will
implicitly set α1 = ητ1 and α2 = βτ2. It forms e(g, g)
α1 as e3(T1, g
b⃗1) and
e(g, g)α2 as e3(T1, g
b⃗2). It gives the public parameters to A.
To create a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, B proceeds as
follows. It chooses random values t̃1, t̃2, γ̃ ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t1 = ηt̃1 and



































We note that the multiple of b⃗∗3 appearing in the exponent of K is either equal
to γ̃ or γ̃ + τ3, depending on the nature of T1. Either way, this is a properly
distributed semi-functional key (whose distribution is independent of τ3 even
if it is present).
To create the semi-functional ciphertext for some n × ℓ access matrix
(A, ρ), B can use the same procedure employed in the proof of Lemma 15 to
use the U terms to provide the semi-functional components. We repeat the
description of this procedure below for the reader’s convenience. The only
difference here comes in computing the blinding factor for M ′.




j ∈ Zp for each j from 1 to ℓ. It also
chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to 1, and random vectors
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ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to 0. It implicitly sets s1 = µ1, s2 = µ2,













and r3j = µ3r̃
3
j . We note that these values are properly distributed. The
ciphertext is formed as:
















for all j from 1 to ℓ.




2, then we have e3(U1, T1) =
e(g, g)(α1s1+α2s2), and hence we have a properly distributed semi-functional en-







3, then we have e3(U1, T1) = e(g, g)
(α1s1+α2s2+µ3τ3). Since τ3
is random (and independent of the semi-functional keys and the rest of the ci-
phertext), this blinding factor is distributed as a freshly random group element
of GT (note that µ3 is nonzero with all but negligible probability). Therefore
the ciphertext is distributed as a semi-functional encryption of a random mes-
sage, as required in Gamefinal. Thus, B can leverage A’s non-negligible differ-
ence in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage
against the subspace assumption.
Combining Lemmas 4, 14, 15, 16, and 17, Theorem 12 follows.
63
Chapter 6
An Unrestricted CP-ABE System
We now present a CP-ABE scheme that is proven fully secure without
placing any restrictions on the reuse of attributes, retaining the efficiency of
prior selectively secure schemes. Our proof strategy combines the dual system
encryption methodology developed above with the selective security techniques
for KP-ABE and CP-ABE systems in [39] and [69] respectively. We still rely
on the decisional linear assumption to execute our dual system encryption
methodology, but we will also inherit additional kinds of assumptions from
the methodologies in [39, 69]. We state our additional assumptions formally
below.
6.1 Additional Complexity Assumptions
The arguments in [39, 69] relied on assumptions very close to those we
state below, with the main difference being that the assumptions in [39, 69]
have challenge terms in the target group GT while we will have challenge terms
in the source group G. This is because the selective security arguments can
afford to deal with all keys at once, and hence can use an assumption with a
challenge in the target group to change the ciphertext to an encryption of a
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random message. This kind of change simultaneously affects the interaction
of the ciphertext with all keys. In our hybrid framework, we handle keys
individually, and hence we use an assumption with a challenge in the source
group to change the nature of individual keys one at a time, saving our progress
incrementally until we arrive at the final step and can afford to change to an
encryption of a random message. One could alternatively handle the Phase II
queries all at once using an assumption with a challenge in the target group,
but we prefer to address the two key query phases symmetrically.
We first introduce the Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption. This is
a close relative of the standard Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption,
but it has a challenge term remaining in the source group. This adjustment
from the usual DBDH assumption allows us to use our assumption in the semi-
functional space for a particular key - without affecting the ciphertext or the
other keys.
The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption Given a group generator
G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G,
g
R←− G, x, y, z R←− Zp,





We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
Adv3DHG,A (λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]∣∣.
We say that G satisfies the Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption ifAdv3DHG,A (λ)
is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
We next introduce a q-type assumption that we call the Source Group q-
Parallel BDHE Assumption. This is a close relative of the Decisional q-Parallel
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption introduced in [69], except that
its challenge term remains in the source group. In Appendix 1, we prove that
this assumption holds in the generic group model. Below, we use the notation
[q], for example, to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , q}.
The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption Given a group gen-
erator G and a positive integer q, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G,
g
R←− G, c, d, f, b1, . . . , bq
R←− Zp,
The adversary will be given:
D = (G, g, gf , gdf , gc, gc2 , . . . , gcq , gcq+2 , . . . , gc2q ,
gc
i/bj ∀i ∈ [2q] \ {q + 1}, j ∈ [q],






We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
AdvqG,A(λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]| .
We say that G satisfies the Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption if
AdvqG,A is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
6.2 Construction
This closely resembles the scheme from the previous section, but with
one extra tuple of group elements for each key and ciphertext. This extra
term is helpful in performing a cancelation during our security proof (when
we are dealing with Phase II queries). We again assume that messages to
be encrypted are elements of the target group GT and we allow linear secret
sharing schemes, represented by access matrices (A, ρ), as access structures.
As before, we let the attribute universe be {1, 2, . . . ,U}, where U is polynomial
in the security parameter.
Setup(λ,U) → PP,MSK The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G
of prime order p and a generator g. It randomly chooses two pairs of dual
orthonormal bases (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual or-
thonormal bases (B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) of dimension 6. We let b⃗i, b⃗∗i denote the
basis vectors belonging to (B,B∗), and b⃗i,j, b⃗∗i,j denote the basis vectors belong-
ing to (Bj,B∗j) for each j from 0 to U. The setup algorithm also chooses two
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random exponents α1, α2 ∈ Zp. The public parameters consist of:
PP := {G, p, gb⃗1 , gb⃗2 , gb⃗1,0 , gb⃗2,0 , gb⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗4,i ∀i ∈ [U], e(g, g)α1 , e(g, g)α2}.
The master secret key additionally contains:
MSK := {gα1b⃗∗1 , gα2b⃗∗2 , gb⃗∗1 , gb⃗∗2 , gb⃗∗1,0 , gb⃗∗2,0 , gb⃗∗1,i , . . . , gb⃗∗4,i ∀i ∈ [U] }.
KeyGen(MSK, S,PP)→ SK The key generation algorithm chooses random
exponents t1, t2, u1, u2 ∈ Zp and computes:
















4,i ∀i ∈ S.
The secret key is (it additionally includes S)
SK := {K, K0, {Ki}i∈S}.
Encrypt((A, ρ),PP,M) → CT We assume M ∈ GT , A is an ℓ × n ma-
trix, and ρ is map from each row Aj of A to an attribute ρ(j) (the index
j ranges from 1 to ℓ). The encryption algorithm chooses random exponents
s1, s2, {r1j , r2j}ℓj=1 ∈ Zp. It also chooses random vectors v1, v2 ∈ Znp with first
entries equal to s1 and s2 respectively. The ciphertext is formed as (it addi-
tionally includes (A, ρ)):





(Aj ·v1+r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j)−r1j b⃗2,ρ(j)+(Aj ·v2+r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j)−r2j b⃗4,ρ(j) ∀j = 1, . . . , ℓ.
Decrypt(CT,PP, SK)→ M The decryption algorithm computes constants
ωj ∈ Zp such that
∑







Y := e3(K,C)/e3(K0, C0).
The message is recovered as:
M =M ′X/Y.
Correctness We observe that for each j,











ρ(j)∈S ωjAj ·v2) = e(g, g)(t1s1+t2s2).
We note that
Y = e(g, g)(s1(α1+t1+u1)+s2(α2+t2+u2))/e(g, g)(s1u1+s2u2) = e(g, g)(s1(α1+t1)+s2(α2+t2)),
and therefore:




Theorem 18. Under the decisional linear assumption, the three party Diffie-
Hellman assumption, and the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption de-
fined in Section 6.1, the CP-ABE system presented in Section 6.2 is fully secure
in the sense of Definition 8.
We begin by defining our various types of semi-functional keys and
ciphertexts. The semi-functional space in the exponent will correspond to the
span of b⃗3, b⃗
∗
3, the span of b⃗3,0, b⃗
∗





Semi-functional Keys To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute
set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal
key consisting of K,K0, {Ki}i∈S. One then chooses a random value γ ∈ Zp
and multiplies K by gγb⃗
∗
3 . The other components of the key remain unchanged.
Semi-functional Ciphertexts To produce a semi-functional ciphertext for
an LSSS matrix (A, ρ), one first calls the normal encryption algorithm to
produce a normal ciphertext consisting of M ′, C, C0, {Cj}. One then chooses
random values s3, {r3j} ∈ Zp and a random vector v3 ∈ Znp with first entry
equal to s3. The semi-functional ciphertext is:
M ′, Cgs3b⃗3 , C0g
s3b⃗3,0 , Cjg
(Aj ·v3+r3j )⃗b5,ρ(j)−r3j b⃗6,ρ(j) ∀j = 1, . . . , ℓ.
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Nominal Semi-functional Keys To produce a nominal semi-functional
key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to
produce a normal key consisting of K,K0, {Ki}i∈S. One then chooses random







6,i ∀i ∈ S.
We note that a nominal semi-functional key still correctly decrypts a semi-
functional ciphertext.
Temporary Semi-functional Keys A temporary semi-functional key is
similar to a nominal key, except that the semi-functional component attached
to K will now be randomized (this will prevent correct decryption of a semi-
functional ciphertext). More formally, to produce a temporary semi-functional
key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to
produce a normal key consisting of K,K0, {Ki}i∈S. One then chooses random







6,i ∀i ∈ S.
We let Gamereal denote the real security game. We let Q1 denote the
number of Phase I key queries the attacker makes, Q2 denote the number of
Phase II queries, and Q = Q1 + Q2 denote the total number of queries. For
each k from 1 to Q, we define the following additional games:
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Gamek In this game, the ciphertext given to the attacker is semi-functional,
as are the first k keys. The remaining keys are normal.
GameNk This is like Gamek, except that the k
th key given to the attacker is
a nominal semi-functional key. The first k− 1 keys are still semi-functional in
the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal.
GameTk This is like Gamek, except that the k
th key given to the attacker is
a temporary semi-functional key. The first k− 1 keys are still semi-functional
in the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal.
Lastly, we define Gamefinal to be like GameQ (i.e. everything the at-
tacker receives is semi-functional), except that the ciphertext is now a semi-
functional encryption of a random message. In this final game, any attacker
has advantage 0, since its view is distributed independently of the bit that it
must guess.
The outer structure of our hybrid argument will progress as follows.
First, we transition from Gamereal to Game0, then to Game1, next to Game2,
and so on. We ultimately arrive at GameQ, where the ciphertext and all
of the keys given to the attacker are semi-functional. We then transition to
Gamefinal.
The transitions from Gamereal to Game0 and from GameQ to Gamefinal
are relatively easy, and can be accomplished directly via a computational as-
sumption. The transitions from Gamek−1 to Gamek require more intricate
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arguments. In order to get from Gamek−1 to Gamek in our hybrid argument,
we will transition first from Gamek−1 to Game
N
k , then to Game
T
k , and finally




k will require different com-
putational assumptions for Phase I and Phase II key queries. We let Q1 denote
the number of Phase I queries, and we will address this transition separately
for k ≤ Q1 and k > Q1. Our handling of Phase I queries will closely resemble
the selective security proof strategy for KP-ABE in [39], while our handling of
Phase II queries will closely resemble the selective security proof strategy for
CP-ABE in [69].
The hybrid security proof is accomplished in the following lemmas.
Lemma 19. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamereal and Game0.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in ad-
vantage between Gamereal and Game0, we will create a PPT algorithm B to
break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with
parameters m = U+2, ni = 3, ki = 1 for two values of i, and ni = 6, ki = 2 for
the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption
with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we will de-
note the bases involved in the assumption by (D,D∗), (D0,D∗0) ∈ Dual(Z3p) and
(D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is given (we will ignore the U terms, gη,
gβ, gητ1 , gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be needed):














3,0 , {gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
T1, T1,0, {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















3,0 respectively. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms






















It is B’s task to determine if these τ3 contributions are present or not.
B implicitly sets the bases for the construction as:
b⃗1 = ηd⃗
∗
1, b⃗2 = βd⃗
∗













1,0, b⃗2,0 = βd⃗
∗













1,i, b⃗2,i = ηd⃗
∗
2,i, b⃗3,i = βd⃗
∗
3,i, b⃗4,i = βd⃗
∗
4,i, b⃗5,i = d⃗
∗















5,i = d⃗5,i, b⃗
∗
6,i = d⃗6,i ∀i.
We note that these are properly distributed because (D,D∗), (D0,D∗0), etc. are
randomly chosen.
B can use the terms given in the assumption to produce gb⃗1 , gb⃗2 , gb⃗1,0 ,
gb⃗2,0 , {gb⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗4,i} for the public parameters. B chooses random values


















B gives the public parameters to A.
To produce a normal key for an attribute set S, B proceeds as follows.
It chooses random values t̃1, t̃2, ũ1, ũ2 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t1 = ηt̃1, t2 = βt̃2,
u1 = ηũ1, u2 = βũ2. It forms the key as:







































To produce the challenge ciphertext for an access matrix (A, ρ) of size
ℓ×n, B implicitly sets s1 = τ1 and s2 = τ2. It chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp
with first entry equal to 1. It also chooses random vectors ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with
first entries equal to 0. It will implicitly set v1 = s1v + ṽ1 and v2 = s2v + ṽ2.
We note that these are properly distributed as independent, random vectors
with first entries equal to s1 and s2 respectively. For each j from 1 to ℓ, B




j ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets r1j = r̃3j τ1 + r̃1j ,
r2j = r̃
3
j τ2 + r̃
2
j . We note that these values are properly distributed because
r̃1j , r̃
2
j are random. The ciphertext is formed as:



























for all j from 1 to ℓ.
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If the exponents of the T terms do not include the τ3 terms, then the
exponent vector of C is s1⃗b1+ s2⃗b2, the exponent vector of C0 is s1⃗b1,0+ s2⃗b2,0,
and the exponent vector of Cj is:
= (Aj · τ1v + Aj · ṽ1 + τ1r̃3j + r̃1j )ηd⃗∗1,ρ(j) + (−τ1r̃3j − r̃1j )ηd⃗∗2,ρ(j)
+(Aj · τ2v + Aj · ṽ2 + τ2r̃3j + r̃2j )βd⃗∗3,ρ(j) + (−τ2r̃3j − r̃2j )βd⃗∗4,ρ(j)
= (Aj · v1 + r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j) − r1j b⃗2,ρ(j) + (Aj · v2 + r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j) − r2j b⃗4,ρ(j).
Thus we have a properly distributed normal ciphertext in this case.
If the exponents of the T terms do include the τ3 terms, then the
exponent vector of C is s1⃗b1 + s2⃗b2 + s3⃗b3, where s3 := τ3, the exponent vector
of C0 is s1⃗b1,0 + s2⃗b2,0 + s3⃗b3,0, and the exponent vector of each Cj is:
(Aj · v1 + r1j )⃗b1,ρ(j) − r1j b⃗2,ρ(j) + (Aj · v2 + r2j )⃗b3,ρ(j) − r2j b⃗4,ρ(j)
+(Aj · v + r̃3j )τ3⃗b5,ρ(j) − r̃3j τ3⃗b6,ρ(j).
This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext with v3 = τ3v and
r3j = τ3r̃
j
3. (Note that these values are distributed randomly and independently





Thus, when the τ3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Gamereal,
and when the τ3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game0. As a result,
B can leverage A’s non-negligible difference in advantage between these games
to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
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Lemma 20. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamek−1 and Game
N
k
for any k from 1 to Q.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advan-
tage between Gamek−1 and Game
N
k for some k, we will create a PPT algorithm
B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption
with parametersm = U+2, ni = 3, ki = 1 for two values of i, and ni = 6, ki = 2
for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assump-
tion with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we will
denote the bases involved in the assumption by (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0) ∈ Dual(Z3p)
and (B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is given (we will ignore gη, gβ, gητ1 ,
gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be needed):













3,0 , {gηb⃗∗1,i , gηb⃗∗2,i , gβb⃗∗3,i , gβb⃗∗4,i , gb⃗∗5,i , gb⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
U1 = g
µ1b⃗1+µ2b⃗2+µ3b⃗3 , U1,0 = g
µ1b⃗1,0+µ2b⃗2,0+µ3b⃗3,0 ,
{U1,i = gµ1b⃗1,i+µ2b⃗3,i+µ3b⃗5,i , U2,i = gµ1b⃗2,i+µ2b⃗4,i+µ3b⃗6,i}i∈[U],
T1, T1,0, {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















3,0 respectively. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms
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is B’s task to determine if these τ3 contributions are present or not.
B implicitly sets (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0), {(Bi,B∗i )} as the bases for the con-
struction. It chooses random values α̃1, α̃2 ∈ Zp and implicitly sets α1 = ηα̃1





e(g, g)α2 as e3(g
b⃗2 , gβb⃗
∗
2)α̃2 . B can thus produce the public parameters, and it
gives these to A.
To respond to A’s first k − 1 key queries, B acts as follows. To pro-
duce a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, it chooses random values
t̃1, t̃2, ũ1, ũ2, γ ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t1 = ηt̃1, t2 = βt̃2, u1 = ηũ1, u2 = βũ2.












































In this way, B produces properly distributed semi-functional keys in response
to the first k − 1 key requests. We note that B can similarly produce normal
keys in response to key requests k + 1 and onward using the same procedure
except leaving off gγb⃗
∗
3 from K.
To create the kth key for some attribute set S, B proceeds as follows.
It chooses random values ũ1, ũ2, ũ3 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t1 = ητ1, t2 = βτ2,
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u1 = η(τ1ũ3 + ũ1), and u2 = β(τ2ũ3 + ũ2). We note that these values are
independently random because τ1, τ2, ũ1, ũ2 are independently random. The
























Ki = T1,iT2,i ∀i ∈ S.
If the exponents of the T terms here do not include the τ3 terms, then this is a
properly distributed normal key. If they do include the τ3 terms, then this is a
properly distributed nominal semi-functional key with t3 = τ3 and u3 = τ3ũ3.
(Note that these values are random and independent of t1, t2, u1, u2.)
To create the semi-functional ciphertext for some n × ℓ access matrix




j ∈ Zp for each j from 1 to ℓ. It also
chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to 1, and random vectors
ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to 0. It implicitly sets s1 = µ1, s2 = µ2,













and r3j = µ3r̃
3
j . We note that these values are properly distributed. The
ciphertext is formed as:
M ′ =Mbe3(U1, g
ηb⃗∗1)α̃1e3(U1, g
















for all j from 1 to ℓ.
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Thus, when the τ3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Gamek−1,
and when the τ3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game
N
k . As a result,
B can leverage A’s non-negligible difference in advantage between these games
to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Lemma 21. Under the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption, no polynomial
time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between
GameNk and Game
T
k for any k from 1 to Q1 (recall these are all the Phase I
queries).
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advan-
tage between GameNk and Game
T
k for some k between 1 and Q1, we will create
a PPT algorithm B to break the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption. B is
given g, gx, gy, gz, T , where T is either gxyz or a random element of G. B will
simulate either GameNk or Game
T
k with A depending on the nature of T .
B chooses random dual orthonormal bases (D,D∗), (D0,D∗0) of dimen-
sion 3 and (D1,D∗1), . . ., (DU,D∗U) of dimension 6. It then implicitly sets (B,B∗)
and (B0,B∗0) as follows:




























We note (B,B∗) and (B0,B∗0) are properly distributed.
B sets the normal portions of (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) as follows:
















4,i ∀i = 1, . . . ,U.
The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point
we may verify that all of (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) are properly distributed).
B chooses α1, α2 ∈ Zp randomly. We observe that B can now produce
the public parameters, and also knows the master secret key (enabling it to
create normal keys). It gives the public parameters to A. To create the first
k − 1 semi-functional keys in response to A’s key requests, B first creates a
normal key, then raises gd⃗
∗
3 to a random exponent in Zp and multiplies this by
K. We are using here that B does not need to know gb⃗
∗
3 precisely in order to
create well-distributed semi-functional keys - it suffices for B to know gc⃗b
∗
3 for
some (nonzero) c ∈ Zp.
A requests the kth key for some attribute set S ⊂ [U]. At this point, B
implicitly defines the semi-functional parts of the bases (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U)
as follows (note that these have not been involved in the game before this):
b⃗5,i = x








6,i ∀i /∈ S,








6,i ∀i ∈ S.
We observe that all of (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0), (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) are properly
distributed, and their distribution is independent of x, y, and S (the involve-
ment of x, y, and S is only present in B’s view and is information-theoretically
hidden from A, see Lemma 2).
To create the kth key, B first creates a normal key with components
K,K0, {Ki}i∈S. To create the semi-functional components, it chooses a ran-
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dom value ũ3 and implicitly sets t3 = z, u3 = (xy)
−1ũ3. It then forms the















6,i ∀i ∈ S.






If T = gxyz, then the exponent vector here is xyzd⃗∗3 + ũ3d⃗
∗
3 = (z + u3)⃗b
∗
3, as
required for a nominal semi-functional key. Otherwise, this exponent vector
is distributed as a random multiple of b⃗∗3, as required for a temporary semi-
functional key. Bmultiplies these semi-functional components with the normal
K,K0, {Ki}i∈S to produce the key it gives to A. It can respond to the rest of
A’s key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm.
At some later point, A requests the challenge ciphertext for some ℓ×n
access matrix (A, ρ) that is not satisfied by the attribute set S. B first creates
a normal ciphertext with components M ′, C, C0, {Cj}ℓj=1. To create the semi-
functional components, B first computes a vector ν ∈ Znp that has first entry
equal to 1 and is orthogonal to all of the rows Aj of A such that ρ(j) ∈ S (such
a vector must exist since S fails to satisfy A, and it is efficiently computable).
B also chooses a random vector ṽ3 ∈ Znp subject to the constraint that the
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first entry is zero. It implicitly sets s3 = xy and sets v3 = xyν + xṽ3. We note
that s3 is random because all of the dual orthonormal bases are distributed
independently of x, y, and v3 is distributed as a random vector with first entry
equal to s3. B also chooses random values r
3
j ∈ Zp for all j such that ρ(j) ∈ S
and random values r̃3j ∈ Zp for all j such that ρ(j) /∈ S. For values of j
such that ρ(j) /∈ S, it implicitly sets r3j = xr̃3j . B can then produce the
semi-functional components of the ciphertext as:
gs3b⃗3 = gd⃗3 , gs3b⃗3,0 = gd⃗3,0 ,
g(Aj ·v3+r
3




j d⃗6,ρ(j) ∀j s.t. ρ(j) /∈ S,
g(Aj ·v3+r
3
j )⃗b5,ρ(j)−r3j b⃗6,ρ(j) = (gx)Aj ·ṽ3d⃗5,ρ(j) gr
3
j d⃗5,ρ(j)−r3j d⃗6,ρ(j) ∀j s.t. ρ(j) ∈ S.
Here we have used the fact that Aj · ν = 0 modulo p to avoid needing to
produce a multiple of gxyd⃗5,ρ(j) for j such that ρ(j) ∈ S.
B multiplies these semi-functional components by the normal compo-
nents to form the semi-functional ciphertext, which it gives to A. If T = gxyz,
then B has properly simulated GameNK , and if T is a random group ele-
ment, then B has properly simulated GameTk . Thus, B can leverage A’s non-
negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible
advantage against the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Lemma 22. Under the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption, no polyno-
mial time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between
GameNk and Game
T
k for a k > Q1 using an access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n
where ℓ, n ≤ q.
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Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in ad-
vantage between GameNk and Game
T
k for some k such that Q1 < k ≤ Q
using an access matrix with dimensions ≤ q, we will create a PPT algorithm
B to break the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption. Our B is given:
g, gf , gdf , gc
i ∀i ∈ [2q] \ {q + 1}, gci/bj ∀i ∈ [2q] \ {q + 1}, j ∈ [q], gdfbj ∀j ∈ [q],
gdfc
ibj′/bj ∀i ∈ [q], j, j′ ∈ [q] such that j ̸= j′, and T , where T is either equal to
gdc
q+1
or is a random element of G. B will simulate either GameNk or Game
T
k
with A, depending on T .
B chooses random dual orthonormal bases (D,D∗), (D0,D∗0) of dimen-
sion 3 and (D1,D∗1), . . ., (DU,D∗U) of dimension 6. It then implicitly sets (B,B∗)
and (B0,B∗0) as follows:




























We note that (B,B∗) and (B0,B∗0) are properly distributed.
B sets the normal portions of (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) as follows:















4,i ∀i = 1, . . . ,U.
The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point
we may verify that all of (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) are properly distributed).
B chooses α1, α2 ∈ Zp randomly. We observe that B can now produce
the public parameters, and also knows the master secret key (enabling it to
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create normal keys). It gives the public parameters to A. To create the first
k − 1 semi-functional keys in response to A’s key requests, B first creates a
normal key, then raises gd⃗
∗
3 to a random exponent in Zp and multiplies this by
K. As in the proof of the previous lemma, we note here that B does not need
to know gb⃗
∗
3 precisely in order to create well-distributed semi-functional keys.
Before requesting the kth key, A will request the challenge ciphertext
for some access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n, where both ℓ, n ≤ q. For each
attribute i, we let Ji denote the set of indices j ∈ [ℓ] such that ρ(j) = i. For
each i, B chooses a random value η̃i and defines a value ηi ∈ Zp by
ηi = η̃i +
∑
j∈Ji
cAj,1/bj + . . .+ c
nAj,n/bj.
At this point, B implicitly sets the semi-functional portions of the bases
(B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) as follows (note that these have played no role in the
game before this point):











We observe that (B1,B∗1), . . ., (BU,B∗U) are properly distributed.
To create the challenge ciphertext, B first creates a normal ciphertext
using the normal encryption algorithm. To create the semi-functional compo-
nents, it implicitly sets s3 = cdf . It also chooses random values y2, . . . , yn ∈ Zp
and random values r̃3j ∈ Zp for each j ∈ [ℓ]. It implicitly sets v3 = (cdf, dfc2 +
y2, . . . , dfc
n + yn). This is distributed as a random vector with first entry




are distributed as uniformly random elements because each r̃3j is random and
ηρ(j) ̸= 0 with all but negligible probability. We observe:




cAj′,1/bj′ + . . .+ c
nAj′,n/bj′
+ r̃3jηρ(j)
By definition, j ∈ Jρ(j), so we have some cancelation here:




cAj′,1/bj′ + . . .+ c
nAj′n/bj′
 .
We now see that B can compute gAj ·v3+r
3
j using the terms it is given in the
assumption, enabling it to produce g(Aj ·v3+r
3
j )d⃗5,ρ(j) = g(Aj ·v3+r
3
j )⃗b5,i . We also see
that




ρ(j)d⃗6,i = (dfbj − r̃
j
3)d⃗6,i,
so B can also produce g−r
3
j b⃗6,ρ(j) . In this way, B produces the semi-functional
component of Cj for each j with the proper distribution.










It gives the resulting properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext to A.
At some later point in the game, A requests the kth key for some
attribute set S. B can create the normal parts of the key using the normal
key generation algorithm. To create the semi-functional parts, B proceeds as
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follows. Since S does not satisfy (A, ρ), B can (efficiently) compute a vector
w ∈ Znp such that its first entry is non-zero and w is orthogonal (modulo
p) to all rows Aj of A such that ρ(j) ∈ S. We may assume the first entry
of w is randomized. B implicitly sets t3 = w1c
q + . . . + wnc
q−n+1, which
is properly distributed because w1 is random (and c is nonzero with all but
negligible probability). B also chooses a random value ũ3 and implicitly sets
u3 = −w2cq−1− . . .−wncq−n+1+ fc−1ũ3. This is properly distributed because
ũ3 is random (and fc













)ũ3d⃗∗3 . If T = gdcq+1 , this
is equal to g(t3+u3 )⃗b
∗
3 , as required for a nominal semi-functional key. Otherwise,
this exponent is distributed as a random multiple of b⃗∗3, as required for a
temporary semi-functional key. We also have
u3⃗b
∗
3,0 = (−w2cq − . . .− wncq−n+2 + fũ3)d⃗∗3,0,
enabling B to produce gu3b⃗
∗
3,0 using the terms given in the assumption.















q + . . .+ wnc
q−n+1)(η̃i +∑
j∈Ji





For each j ∈ Ji, we have ρ(j) = i. So for i ∈ S, we have Aj · w = 0 modulo p
for every j ∈ Ji. Thus, all of the terms involving cq+1 cancel, and we are left
with terms that can be created in the exponent from the group elements given
in the assumption (note that n ≤ q, so 2q is an upper bound on the powers of
c involved here). This shows that B can create gt3b⃗6,i for all i ∈ S, and hence
can produce properly distributed semi-functional components for each Ki of
the kth key.
B can respond to the rest of A’s key requests by producing normal keys
via the normal key generation algorithm. If T = gdc
q+1
, then B has properly
simulated GameNk . If T is distributed randomly, then B has properly simu-
lated GameTk . Thus, B can leverage A’s non-negligible difference in advantage
between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against the source
group q-parallel BDHE assumption.
Lemma 23. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between GameTk and Gamek
for any k from 1 to Q.
Proof. This proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 20, except that B
adds an additional term of gγb⃗
∗
3 to K for the kth key (where it chooses γ ∈ Zp
randomly). This ensures that when the τ3 terms are not present, the k
th key
will be a properly distributed semi-functional key.
Lemma 24. Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can
achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between GameQ and Gamefinal.
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Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in ad-
vantage between GameQ and Gamefinal, we will create a PPT algorithm B
to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assump-
tion with parameters m = U + 2, ni = 3, ki = 1 for two values of i, and
ni = 6, ki = 2 for the rest of the values of i. To coincide with our nota-
tion for the construction, we will denote the bases involved in the assumption
by (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0) ∈ Dual(Z3p) and (B1,B∗1), . . . , (BU,B∗U) ∈ Dual(Z6p). B is
given (we will ignore µ3, g
η, gβ, gητ1 , gβτ2 , and T1,0, {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U] because they
will not be needed):













3,0 , {gηb⃗∗1,i , gηb⃗∗2,i , gβb⃗∗3,i , gβb⃗∗4,i , gb⃗∗5,i , gb⃗∗6,i}i∈[U],
U1 = g
µ1b⃗1+µ2b⃗2+µ3b⃗3 , U1,0 = g
µ1b⃗1,0+µ2b⃗2,0+µ3b⃗3,0 ,
{U1,i = gµ1b⃗1,i+µ2b⃗3,i+µ3b⃗5,i , U2,i = gµ1b⃗2,i+µ2b⃗4,i+µ3b⃗6,i}i∈[U], T1.











3. It is B’s task to determine if this τ3 contribution is
present or not.
B sets (B,B∗), (B0,B∗0), {(Bi,B∗i )} as the bases for the construction. It
will implicitly set α1 = ητ1 and α2 = βτ2. It forms e(g, g)
α1 as e3(T1, g
b⃗1) and
e(g, g)α2 as e3(T1, g
b⃗2). It gives the public parameters to A.
To create a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, B proceeds
as follows. It chooses random values t̃1, t̃2, ũ1, ũ2, γ̃ ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets
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We note that the multiple of b⃗∗3 appearing in the exponent of K is either equal
to γ̃ or γ̃ + τ3, depending on the nature of T1. Either way, this is a properly
distributed semi-functional key (whose distribution is independent of τ3 even
if it is present).
To create the semi-functional ciphertext for some n × ℓ access matrix
(A, ρ), B can use the same procedure employed in the proof of Lemma 20 to
use the U terms to provide the semi-functional components. We repeat the
description of this procedure below for the reader’s convenience. The only
difference here comes in computing the blinding factor for M ′.




j ∈ Zp for each j from 1 to ℓ. It also
chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to 1, and random vectors
ṽ1, ṽ2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to 0. It implicitly sets s1 = µ1, s2 = µ2,













and r3j = µ3r̃
3
j . We note that these values are properly distributed. The
ciphertext is formed as:

















for all j from 1 to ℓ.




2, then we have
e3(U1, T1) = e(g, g)
(α1s1+α2s2),
and hence we have a properly distributed semi-functional encryption ofMb, as








e3(U1, T1) = e(g, g)
(α1s1+α2s2+µ3τ3).
Since τ3 is random (and independent of the semi-functional keys and the
rest of the ciphertext), this blinding factor is distributed as a freshly ran-
dom group element of GT (note that µ3 is nonzero with all but negligible
probability). Therefore the ciphertext is distributed as a semi-functional en-
cryption of a random message, as required in Gamefinal. Thus, B can leverage
A’s non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a
non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Combining Lemmas 4 and 19 - 24, Theorem 18 follows.
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Chapter 7
A Multi-Authority CP-ABE System
We now present a multi-authority attribute-based encryption system.
In our system, any party can become an authority and there is no require-
ment for any global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of
common reference parameters. A party can simply act as an authority by cre-
ating a public key and issuing private keys to different users that reflect their
attributes. Different authorities need not even be aware of each other. We
use the Chase [22] concept of global identifiers to “link” private keys together
that were issued to the same user by different authorities. A user can encrypt
data in terms of any LSSS matrix over attributes issued from any chosen set
of authorities.
Finally, our system does not require any central authority. We thus
avoid the performance bottleneck incurred by relying on a central authority,
which makes our system more scalable. We also avoid placing absolute trust in
a single designated entity which must remain active and uncorrupted through-
out the lifetime of the system. This is a crucial improvement for efficiency
as well as security, since even a central authority that remains uncorrupted
may occasionally fail for benign reasons, and a system that constantly relies
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on its participation will be forced to remain stagnant until it can be restored.
In our system, authorities can function entirely independently, and the failure
or corruption of some authorities will not affect the operation of functioning,
uncorrupted authorities. This makes our system more robust than previous
approaches.
Remark 25. The original version of this scheme in [51] was constructed in com-
posite order bilinear groups, and as a result it required the common reference
parameters to be created during a trusted setup. This was needed in order for
the factorization of the group order to remain secret. Translating the system
into prime order groups using the DPVS framework avoids this feature. This
was first observed by Okamoto and Takashima, who also provide a prime order
analog of our multi-authority scheme in [61].
Challenges and Our Techniques In the multi-authority setting, we want
to satisfy the simultaneous goals of autonomous key generation and collusion
resistance. The requirement of autonomous key generation means that estab-
lished techniques for key randomization cannot be applied since there is no
one party to compile all the pieces together. Furthermore, in our system each
component may come from a different authority, where such authorities have
no coordination and are possibly not even aware of each other and there is no
preset access structure.1
1Prior works [22, 23] assumed coordination ahead of time between different authorities
and required a limited access structure.
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In constructing our system, our central technical hurdle is to make it
collusion resistant. Our single authority ABE systems above achieved collusion
resistance when the ABE system authority “tied” together different compo-
nents (representing different attributes) of a user’s private key by randomizing
the key. Such randomization would make the different key components com-
patible with each other, but not with the parts of a key issued to another
user.
To replace this, we develop a novel technique for tying a user’s key com-
ponents together and preventing collusion attacks between users with different
global identifiers. At a high level, instead of relying on one key generation call
to tie all key components together, we will use a hash function on the user’s
global identity, GID, to manage collusion resistance across multiple key gen-
erations issued by different authorities.
In our system, we define a hash function H (modeled as a random or-
acle) that hashes each identity to a pair of (bilinear) group elements. We will
use the group elements output from the hash function H(GID) as the linchpin
to tie keys together. Our main idea is to structure the decryption mechanism
at each satisfied row Aj in the access matrix (A, ρ) such that a user will recover






GID) denote the pair of elements output by H(GID), v will be a
vector with first entry equal to the exponent of the blinding factor on the mes-
sage (denoted by s), and each of w1, w2 will be a vector with first entry equal
to 0. This structure allows for the decryption algorithm to both reconstruct
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the main secret s and to unblind it in parallel. If a user with a particular
identifier GID satisfies the access matrix, he can reconstruct s in the exponent
by raising the group elements to the proper exponents. This operation will
simultaneously reconstruct the shares of 0 and thus the e(g,H1GID), e(g,H
2
GID)
terms will cancel out. Intuitively, if two users with different global identifiers
GID,GID′ attempt to collude, the cancelation will not work since the w1, w2
shares in the exponents will have different bases.
Remark 26. The reason we haveH output a random pair of group elements and
have two vectors sharing 0 is that it allows us to embed 2-dimensional spaces
from the subspace assumption into these terms. In the original composite
order scheme, this duplication was not needed.
7.1 Construction
For simplicity, we will conflate notation for authorities and attributes
and assume that each authority controls exactly one attribute (we will retain
this simplification in our security proof as well). In practice, we would allow
a single authority to control several attributes, and the authority would run
the setup algorithm below for each attribute (so each attribute would have its
own public key and secret key). We assume that messages to be encrypted are
elements of the target group GT .
Global Setup(λ) → GP The global setup algorithm chooses a bilinear
group G of prime order p and a generator g. It also defines a hash function H
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mapping global identifiers to pairs of elements in G, so H : {0, 1}∗ → G×G.
The global parameters are:
GP := {G, p, g,H}.
Authority Setup(GP) → SK,PK Each authority (indexed by i) chooses
random dual orthonormal bases (Bi,B∗i )
R←− Dual(Z12p ) and two uniformly
random exponents α1i , α
2
i ∈ Zp. It publishes the public parameters:
PK := {e(g, g)α1i , e(g, g)α2i , gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , gb⃗3,i , gb⃗4,i}.
Its corresponding secret key is:





Encrypt(M, (A, ρ),GP, {PK}) → CT The encryptor chooses a uniformly
random exponent s ∈ Zp. For an ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ), the encryptor
chooses three random vectors v, w1, w2 ∈ Znp subject to the constraints that
the first entry of v is equal to s and the first entries of w1 and w2 are equal to
0. For each j from 1 to ℓ, it also chooses random values r1j , r
2
j ∈ Zp. It then
computes:











j+Aj ·w1 )⃗b2,ρ(j)+r2j b⃗3,ρ(j)+(r2j+Aj ·w2 )⃗b4,ρ(j) , ∀j ∈ [ℓ].
The ciphertext CT consists of C, {Dj}, {Cj} (as well as (A, ρ)).
96
KeyGen(GID,GP, i, SK)→ Ki,GID To generate a secret key for a user with
identity GID, authority i computes H(GID) = (H1GID, H
2













Decrypt(CT,GP, {Ki,GID})→M To decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under
a ℓ× n access matrix (A, ρ), an authorized user chooses constants ωj ∈ Zp for
j from 1 to ℓ such that
∑
j ωjAj = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and ωj is only non-zero when
ρ(j) is an attribute the user has a secret key for. For each j such that ωj ̸= 0,
the user computes:
Fj := Dj/e12(Kρ(j),GID, Cj).
It then recovers the message as:
M = C/
∏




Correctness We observe that









Thus, each Fj = e(g, g)
Aj ·ve(g,H1GID)
Aj ·w1e(g,H2GID)
Aj ·w2 , and hence
∏
j s.t. ωj ̸=0
F
ωj
j = e(g, g)
∑
j ωjAj ·v = e(g, g)s.
(This follows because
∑
j ωjAj is orthogonal to w
1 and w2 modulo p.)
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7.2 Security Proof
We will assume that the row labeling function ρ for an access matrix
must be injective, the same restriction we imposed in Chapter 5. One can then
employ the encoding technique described in Section 5.2 to obtain a system
allowing bounded reuse of attributes.
As in the proof in Chapter 5, we will argue that nominal semi-functionality
is information-theoretically hidden from the attacker. It will again be crucial
to arrange for our information-theoretic argument to take place in a part of the
semi-functional space that is only occupied by one key at a time. However, we
no longer have a “header” term in the key to act as a structural linchpin and
provide the part of the semi-functional space where all semi-functional keys si-
multaneously reside. To accommodate our now decentralized keys, we design
our semi-functional space as having two halves: semi-functional ciphertexts
will have components in both halves, while semi-functional keys will first have
components in one half and then will be “switched” to having components in
the other half. In this way, we can think of the semi-functional space for keys
as being divided into a temporary space and a permanent space. Throughout
our hybrid argument, at most one key will have components in the tempo-
rary space. This enables us to execute our information-theoretic argument in
the temporary space, and then switch and save our progress key by key in
the permanent space. Concretely, our permanent semi-functional space in the
keys will be spanned by b⃗∗5,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
8,i for each attribute i, while our temporary





Theorem 27. Under the decisional linear assumption, the multi-authority CP-
ABE system constructed in Section 7.1 is fully secure in the sense of Definition
10 when H is a random oracle, under the restriction that for an access matrix
(A, ρ), the row labeling function ρ must be injective.
We must first define our semi-functional objects.
Semi-functional Ciphertexts A semi-functional ciphertext for a ℓ × n
LSSS matrix (A, ρ) is created as follows. First, a normal ciphertext C, {Dj, Cj}
is created by running the normal encryption algorithm. We let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote
the set of indices j such that ρ(j) is an attribute belonging to a corrupted
authority, and we let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote the complement. We note that for a valid
matrix (A, ρ) in the security game, the rows indexed by B cannot include the
vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span.






j ∈ Zp are chosen for each j ∈ B, along
with vectors θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4 ∈ Znp chosen randomly up to the constraint that they
are orthogonal to all rows Aj such that j ∈ B (note their first entries will be
random). The semi-functional ciphertext is formed by retaining the values of











j+Aj ·θ3 )⃗b10,ρ(j)+γ4j b⃗11,ρ(j)+(γ4j+Aj ·θ4 )⃗b12,ρ(j) .
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This essentially creates two additional copies of the normal system in the
spaces spanned by b⃗5,ρ(j), . . . , b⃗8,ρ(j) and b⃗9,ρ(j), . . . , b⃗12,ρ(j) for each j ∈ B. Note
that for these copies, θ1, . . . , θ4 share random values, not zero. The terms Cj
for j ∈ B are left unchanged.
Permanent Semi-functional Keys A permanent semi-functional key for
an attribute set S is created as follows. First, a normal key {Ki,GID} is created
by running the normal key generation algorithms for each attribute i ∈ S.
Then random exponents ξ1GID, ξ
2















This creates an additional copy of the normal system in the permanent semi-
functional space, with gξ
1
GID playing the the role of H1GID and g
ξ2GID playing the
role of H2GID.
Temporary Semi-functional Keys A temporary semi-functional key for
an attribute set S is created as follows. First, a normal key {Ki,GID} is created
by running the normal key generation algorithms for each attribute i ∈ S.
Then random exponents ξ3GID, ξ
4















This creates an additional copy of the normal system in the temporary semi-
functional space, with gξ
3




We let Gamereal denote the real security game defined in Section 4.4.1.
We let Q denote the total number of GID’s that are queried by the attacker.
For each such GID, the attacker may query for several attributes (these queries
may be arbitrarily interspersed with other queries). For each k from 1 to Q,
we refer to the “kth key” as the set of all attribute keys given to the attacker
corresponding to the kth queried GID value. In all of the games below, keys
will be grouped in this way by GID value (so when we say “the first k keys”,
we mean keys corresponding to the first k GID values). We also define the
following games:
Gamek For each k from 0 to Q, Gamek is like Gamereal, except that the
ciphertext given to the attacker is semi-functional and the first k keys given to
the attacker are permanent semi-functional. The remaining keys are normal.
GameTk For each k from 1 to Q, Game
T
k is like Gamek, except that the k
th
key is a temporary semi-functional key.
Gamefinal This is like GameQ (everything given to the attacker is semi-
functional), except that the ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a
random message.
Our hybrid argument will proceed from Gamereal to Game0, then to
GameT1 , then to Game1, then to Game
T
2 , and so on, until arriving at GameQ
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and finally transitioning to Gamefinal. This is accomplished in the following
lemmas. Though we will not repeat this in the statement of each lemma, we
remind the reader that our proof takes places in the random oracle model.
Lemma 28. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can attain a
non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamereal and Game0.
Proof. We will actually perform this transition in four (nearly) identical stages.
First, we will use the subspace assumption to expand the Cj pieces (corre-
sponding to good authorities) in the ciphertext into the span of b⃗5,ρ(j), b⃗6,ρ(j)
in the exponent. We then repeat this process to expand into the span of
b⃗7,ρ(j), b⃗8,ρ(j), and then into the span of b⃗9,ρ(j), b⃗10,ρ(j), and then finally into the
span of b⃗11,ρ(j), b⃗12,ρ(j). By the end of this process, the ciphertext will be prop-
erly distributed as a semi-functional ciphertext. We will describe here the first
stage, and the others follow analogously.
We assume we have a PPT attacker A who obtains a non-negligible




are random (for all j ∈ B), but γ2j , γ3j , γ4j , θ2, θ3, θ4 are all zero in the challenge
semi-functional ciphertext. We will create a PPT algorithm B attaining a
non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption with m = U (where
1, . . . ,U form the universe of attributes), ni = 12, and ki = 2 for each i.
In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption with the notation of
our construction as conveniently as possible, we will denote the bases involved
in the assumption by (D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U) ∈ Dual(Z12p ). B is given (we will
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ignore the U terms, gητ1 , gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be needed):
G, p, g, gη, gβ, {gd⃗1,i , . . . , gd⃗4,i , gd⃗7,i , . . . , gd⃗12,i}i∈[U],
{gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i , . . . , gd⃗∗12,i}i∈[U],
{T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















6,i respectively. It is B’s task to determine if these τ3
contributions are present or not.
B sets the global parameters as G, p, g, and H will be modeled as a
random oracle. We let S denote the set of all authorities, and A declares
S′ ⊆ S, the set of corrupted authorities. For each good authority, B will set
its public key as follows.




1,i, b⃗2,i = ηd⃗
∗
2,i, b⃗3,i = βd⃗
∗





5,i, b⃗6,i = d⃗
∗














b⃗∗5,i = d⃗5,i, b⃗
∗
6,i = d⃗6,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
12,i = d⃗12,i ∀i.
We note that these are properly distributed because (D1,D∗1), (D2,D∗2), etc.
are randomly chosen. It chooses α̃1i , α̃
2








i . It can then produce the public key
e(g, gη)α̃
1
i , e(g, gβ)α̃
2
i , gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , gb⃗3,i , gb⃗4,i
using the terms given in the assumption.
B must now answer random oracle and key queries made by A. When
A first queries for H(GID), B chooses two random exponents h̃1GID, h̃
2
GID ∈ Zp.







GID) to A and stores the
values so that it can respond consistently if A queries H(GID) again.
When A queries for a key for an identity, attribute pair (GID, i) where
i is controlled by a good authority, B responds as follows. If H(GID) has
not yet been queried, it first defines H1GID, H
2




































At some point, A will declare messages M0,M1 and an ℓ × n access
matrix (A, ρ). We let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote the set of indices j such that ρ(j) is
an attribute controlled by a corrupt authority, and B denote its complement.
It must be the case that the span of the rows Aj of A with j ∈ B does not
include (1, 0, . . . , 0). For all j ∈ B, A also provides the public parameters
e(g, g)α
1
ρ(j) , e(g, g)α
2
ρ(j) , gb⃗1,ρ(j) , . . . , gb⃗4,ρ(j) .
B forms the challenge ciphertext as follows. It first chooses a random
s ∈ Zp and a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to s. B chooses a
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random vector θ̃ ∈ Znp up to the constraint that is orthogonal to all the rows
Aj such that j ∈ B and its first entry is 0. It also chooses random vectors
w̃1, w̃2 ∈ Znp up to the constraint that their first entries are 0. It will implicitly
set w1 = τ1θ̃+w̃
1 and w2 = τ2θ̃+w̃
2. Note that w1, w2 are properly distributed.
B also chooses random values r1j , r
2
j ∈ Zp for each j ∈ B. For each j ∈













j are properly distributed for all values of j.
The ciphertext is computed as:
C = Mbe(g, g)
s,











































)r̃2j+Aj ·w̃2 ∀j ∈ B,
Dj = e(g, g)

















)r2j+Aj ·w̃2 ∀j ∈ B.
In creating Cj for j ∈ B, we have used the fact that Aj · θ̃ = 0 for these values
of j.
If the τ3 terms are absent from the T1,ρ(j), T2,ρ(j) values for ρ(j) ∈ B,
this is a properly distributed normal ciphertext. If the τ3 are present, this is




j for each j ∈ B, and




j all equal to 0.
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We finally argue that θ1 is properly distributed in A’s view, even though
θ̃ has its first entry equal to 0. This is because for each j ∈ B, ρ(j) appears
exactly once, and γ1j b⃗5,ρ(j) + (γ
1
j +Aj · θ1)⃗b6,ρ(j) is distributed independently of
Aj · θ1. This is because b⃗∗5,ρ(j) and b⃗∗6,ρ(j) are never revealed. Hence, by Lemma
2, each of b⃗5,ρ(j), b⃗6,ρ(j) can be multiplied by a random scalar in Zp, and the
resulting values are identically distributed. Thus, no information about Aj · θ1
is revealed for j ∈ B, so the distribution is unaffected by our restriction that
θ̃ have its first entry equal to 0.





nearly identical (note that in these arguments, gb⃗5,ρ(j) , gb⃗6,ρ(j) will be known to
B).
Lemma 29. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can attain a
non-negligible difference in advantage between Gamek−1 and Game
T
k for any
k from 1 to Q.
Proof. We will accomplish this transition in two stages: first, we will move
from a kth key that is normal to a temporary semi-functional key that has a
random value of ξ3GID and ξ
4
GID = 0. Then we will randomize ξ
4
GID to obtain a
properly distributed temporary semi-functional key.
We describe only the first stage here, as the second stage follows analo-
gously. We suppose we have a PPT attacker A that achieves a non-negligible
difference in advantage between Gamek−1 and a game where the k
th key has
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a random value of ξ3GID and ξ
4
GID = 0 for some fixed k. We will build a PPT
algorithm B that breaks the subspace assumption.
We employ the subspace assumption with m = U, ni = 12, and
ki = 2 for all i. We will denote the bases involved in the assumption by
(D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U) ∈ Dual(Z12p ). B is given (we will ignore µ3 because it
will not be needed):
G, p, g, gη, gβ, gητ1 , gβτ2 , {gd⃗1,i , . . . , gd⃗4,i , gd⃗7,i , . . . , gd⃗12,i}i∈[U],
{gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i , . . . , gd⃗∗12,i}i∈[U],
{U1,i, U2,i}i∈[U], {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















6,i respectively. It is B’s task to determine if these τ3
contributions are present or not.
B sets the global parameters as G, p, g, and H will be modeled as a
random oracle. We let S denote the set of all authorities, and A declares
S′ ⊆ S, the set of corrupted authorities. For each good authority i, B will set
its public key as follows.
It implicitly sets the bases Bi,B∗i as:
b⃗1,i = d⃗1,i, . . . , b⃗4,i = d⃗4,i, b⃗5,i = d⃗9,i, . . . , b⃗8,i = d⃗12,i, b⃗9,i = d⃗5,i, . . . , b⃗12,i = d⃗8,i,
b⃗∗1,i = d⃗
∗






















We note that (Bi,B∗i ) is properly distributed, and is a permutation of (Di,D∗i )
(where vectors 5 through 8 and vectors 9 through 12 have switched places).
B chooses α̃1i , α̃
2
i ∈ Zp at random. It implicitly sets α1i = ηα̃1i and
α2i = βα̃
2
i . It can then produce the public key
e(g, g)α
1
i = e(g, gη)α̃
1
i , e(g, g)α
2
i = e(g, gβ)α̃
2
i , gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , gb⃗3,i , gb⃗4,i









4,i , and gb⃗
∗
5,i , . . . , gb⃗
∗
12,i .
B must now answer random oracle and key queries made by A. When
A first queries forH(GID) where GID is not the kth queried identity, B chooses
two random exponents h̃1GID, h̃
2





GID) to A and stores the values so that it can respond consis-
tently if A queries H(GID) again. If A submits a query for H(GID) where




When A queries for a key for an identity, attribute pair (GID, i) where
i is controlled by a good authority and GID is not among the first k queried
identities, B produces a normal key as follows. If H(GID) has not yet been
queried, it first defines H1GID, H
2




















When A queries for a key for an identity, attribute pair (GID, i) where
i is controlled by a good authority and GID is among the first k − 1 queried
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identities, B produces a permanent semi-functional key as follows. If H(GID)
has not yet been queried, it first defines H1GID, H
2
GID as above. Upon the first
key query for GID, it also chooses random values ξ1GID, ξ
2



































(for the permanent semi-functional components). It multiplies these two quan-
tities to together to produce Ki,GID.
When A makes a key query for (GID, i) where GID is the kth queried
identity, B creates the key as follows. If H(GID) has not yet been queried, it
first defines H1GID, H
2














If T1,i and T2,i do not have the τ3 terms in their exponents, then this is a normal
key. If the τ3 terms are present, then this is a temporary semi-functional key
with ξ3GID = τ3 and ξ
4
GID = 0.
At some point, A will declare M0,M1 and request the challenge cipher-
text for some ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ). We let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote the set of
indices j such that ρ(j) is controlled by a corrupted authority, and we let






ρ(j) , gb⃗1,ρ(j) , . . . , gb⃗4,ρ(j) . It must be the case that the span of the rows Aj
of A with j ∈ B does not include (1, 0, . . . , 0).
B creates the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as follows. (This will
be quite similar to the creation of the ciphertext in the proof of the previous
lemma, except that U1,i and U2,i will be used in place of T1,i, T2,i and the
remaining semi-functional components can be added easily.) It first chooses
a random s ∈ Zp and a random vector v ∈ Znp with first entry equal to s. B
chooses a random vector θ̃ ∈ Znp up to the constraint that is orthogonal to all
the rows Aj such that j ∈ B and its first entry is 0. It also chooses random
vectors w̃1, w̃2 ∈ Znp up to the constraint that their first entries are 0. It will
implicitly set w1 = µ1θ̃ + w̃
1 and w2 = µ2θ̃ + w̃
2. We note that w1, w2 are
properly distributed.
B also chooses random values r1j , r
2
j ∈ Zp for each j ∈ B. For each











j . B chooses random vectors θ
1, θ2, θ4 ∈ Znp subject
to the constraint that each is orthogonal to Aj for all j ∈ B, and it chooses




j ∈ Zp for each j ∈ B. It will implicitly set θ3 = µ3θ̃
and γ3j = µ3r̃
3






j , . . . , γ
4
j , θ
1, θ2, θ4 are properly
distributed.
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The semi-functional ciphertext is computed as:
C = Mbe(g, g)
s,




















































)γ4j+Aj ·θ4 ∀j ∈ B,




















)r2j+Aj ·w̃2 ∀j ∈ B.
In creating Cj for j ∈ B, we have used the fact that Aj · θ̃ = 0 for these values
of j.
Finally, we must argue that θ3 = µ3θ̃ is properly distributed in the at-
tacker’s view. In other words, we claim that the first entry of θ̃ is information-
theoretically hidden from A. This follows from the same argument given in the
proof of Lemma 15 since the collection of rows Aj such that j ∈ B or ρ(j) is
queried for the kth GID value cannot include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in its span.
For all j ∈ B such that ρ(j) is not queried for the kth GID value, the share
Aj · θ3 is information theoretically hidden since the basis vectors b⃗∗9,ρ(j), b⃗∗10,ρ(j)
are never revealed. As in the previous formulation of this argument, we rely
on the fact that ρ is an injective function.
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Lemma 30. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can attain a
non-negligible difference in advantage between GameTk and Gamek for any k
from 1 to Q.
Proof. We will accomplish the transition from a temporary semi-functional key
to a permanent semi-functional key in four stages: first, we will move from a






GID = 0 to a key that




GID and only ξ
2
GID = 0. Next, we randomize
ξ2GID, obtaining a key with both temporary and permanent semi-functional
components. We then keep ξ1GID, ξ
2





one at a time.
We begin with the first stage. We suppose that we have a PPT attacker
A that achieves a non-negligible difference in advantage between GameTk and







(for some fixed k). We will build a PPT algorithm B that breaks the subspace
assumption.
We employ the subspace assumption with m = U, ni = 12, and
ki = 2 for all i. We will denote the bases involved in the assumption by
(D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U) ∈ Dual(Z12p ). B is given (we will ignore gη, gβ, gητ1 ,
gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be needed):
G, p, g, {gd⃗1,i , . . . , gd⃗4,i , gd⃗7,i , . . . , gd⃗12,i}i∈[U],
{gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i , . . . , gd⃗∗12,i}i∈[U],
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{U1,i, U2,i}i∈[U], {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















6,i respectively. It is B’s task to determine if these τ3
contributions are present or not.
B sets the global parameters as G, p, g, and H will be modeled as a
random oracle. We let S denote the set of all authorities, and A declares
S′ ⊆ S, the set of corrupted authorities. For each good authority i, B will set
its public key as follows.
It implicitly sets the bases Bi,B∗i as:
b⃗1,i = d⃗9,i, . . . , b⃗4,i = d⃗12,i, b⃗5,i = d⃗5,i, . . . , b⃗8,i = d⃗8,i, b⃗9,i = d⃗1,i, . . . , b⃗12,i = d⃗4,i,
b⃗∗1,i = d⃗
∗





















Observe that (Bi,B∗i ) is just a reordering of the bases (Di,D∗i ), where the first
four and last four vectors have been interchanged within each basis. We note
that (Bi,B∗i ) are properly distributed.
B chooses α1i , α
2
i ∈ Zp at random. It can then produce the public key
e(g, g)α
1
i , e(g, g)α
2
i , gb⃗1,i , gb⃗2,i , gb⃗3,i , gb⃗4,i
using the terms given in the assumption. We note thatB also knows gb⃗
∗
1,i , . . . , gb⃗
∗
8,i .
B must now answer random oracle and key queries made by A. When









GID) to A and stores the values
so that it can respond consistently if A queries H(GID) again.
To respond to queries (GID, i) where GID is not among the first k
queried identities, B produces a normal key as follows. If H(GID) has not




















To respond to queries (GID, i) where GID is among the first k − 1
queried identities, B first produces a normal key as above, and then produces
the permanent semi-functional components as follows. The first time a secret
key for GID is requested, B chooses random exponents ξ1GID, ξ
2
GID ∈ Zp. Then

















and multiplies this by the normal key to produce a permanent semi-functional
key.
To respond to a query (GID, i) where GID is the kth queried identity,
B again first produces a normal key as above. It implicitly sets ξ3GID = ητ1 and
ξ4GID = βτ2. We note that these values are random, hence properly distributed.
It multiplies the normal key by T1,i (T2,i)
−1 to form the semi-functional key.
If the exponents of T1,i and T2,i do not include τ3 terms, then this
produces a properly distributed temporary semi-functional key (with ξ3GID, ξ
4
GID
being random and ξ1GID, ξ
2
GID = 0). If the exponents of T1,i and T2,i do include
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τ3 terms, then this is a semi-functional key with ξ
1





GID are random, while ξ
2
GID = 0.
At some point, A will declare M0,M1 and request the challenge cipher-
text for some ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ). We let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote the set of
indices j such that ρ(j) is controlled by a corrupted authority, and we let





ρ(j) , gb⃗1,ρ(j) , . . . , gb⃗4,ρ(j) . It must be the case that the span of the rows Aj
of A with j ∈ B does not include (1, 0, . . . , 0).
B creates the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as follows. It first
forms the normal components of the ciphertext using the normal encryption
algorithm. To form the semi-functional components, it chooses random vectors
θ̃, θ2, θ̃3, θ̃4 ∈ Znp subject to the constraint that they are orthogonal to all rows
Aj of A such that ρ(j) ∈ B (note that the first entry of each will be randomly
distributed). It will implicity set θ1 = µ3θ̃, θ
3 = µ1θ̃ + θ̃
3, and θ4 = µ2θ̃ + θ̃
4.
We note that these are properly distributed.
For each j ∈ B, B chooses random exponents γ̃j, γ2j , γ̃3j , γ̃4j ∈ Zp. It
implicitly sets γ1j = µ3γ̃j, γ
3
j = µ1γ̃j + γ̃
3
j , and γ
4
j = µ2γ̃j + γ̃
4
j . We note that B
has the values gb⃗7,ρ(j) , . . . , gb⃗12,ρ(j) , but it only has access to b⃗5,ρ(j), b⃗6,ρ(j) in the
























Multiplying the normal components of each Cj for j ∈ B by these values
produces a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext.
Hence, if the τ3 terms are not present, then B has properly simulated
GameTk . If they are present, B has simulated a game where the k
th key has
properly distributed components in the temporary semi-functional space as
well as the first half of the permanent space. This completes the first stage of
our argument.
The other three stages are nearly identical - in the second stage, we may
similarly use the subspace assumption to expand the kth key’s semi-functional
components from the span of b⃗∗9,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
12,i into the span of b⃗
∗
7,i, . . . , b⃗
∗
12,i. Here,




6,i , so the semi-functional terms in
this space can be added easily. The third and fourth stages are then essentially
reversals of the first two stages, with the roles of the permanent semi-functional
space and temporary semi-functional space interchanged.
Lemma 31. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can attain a
non-negligible difference in advantage between GameQ and Gamefinal.
Proof. We suppose there is a PPT algorithm A that attains a non-negligible
difference in advantage between these two games. We will build a PPT algo-
rithm B to break the subspace assumption with parameters m = U, ni = 12,
and ki = 2 for all i. We will denote the bases involved in the assumption by
(D1,D∗1), . . . , (DU,D∗U).
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B is given (we will ignore gητ1 , gβτ2 , and µ3 because they will not be
needed):
G, p, g, gη, gβ, {gd⃗1,i , . . . , gd⃗4,i , gd⃗7,i , . . . , gd⃗12,i}i∈[U],
{gηd⃗∗1,i , gηd⃗∗2,i , gβd⃗∗3,i , gβd⃗∗4,i , gd⃗∗5,i , gd⃗∗6,i , . . . , gd⃗∗12,i}i∈[U],
{U1,i, U2,i}i∈[U], {T1,i, T2,i}i∈[U].






















6,i respectively. It is B’s task to determine if these τ3
contributions are present or not.
B sets the global parameters as G, p, g, and H will be modeled as a
random oracle. We let S denote the set of all authorities, and A declares
S′ ⊆ S, the set of corrupted authorities. For each attribute i controlled by a
good authority, B implicitly sets the bases as follows.
B chooses a random scalar ψ ∈ Zp and defines the 4× 4 matrix P as
P =

−1 1 0 0
0 0 −ψ−1 ψ−1
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
 , P−1 =

0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 ψ 0 1
 ,
We define another orthonormal bases pair DP,i, D∗P,i as in Section 3.2.1:
we let Di be the 12 × 4 matrix whose columns correspond to the vectors
d⃗5,i, . . . , d⃗8,i respectively. Then DiP is also a 12 × 4 matrix, and we replace
the vectors d⃗5,i, . . . , d⃗8,i with its columns to form DP,i. For D∗P,i, we do the
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same using (P−1)t. By Lemma 2, DP,i and D∗P,i are a properly distributed
orthonormal bases pair. B implicitly sets Bi = DP,i and B∗i = D∗P,i.
To set the public keys, B chooses random values α̃1i , α̃
2
i ∈ Zp and im-




i = τ2β + βα̃
2
i . It forms the public keys
as:
{e(g, g)α1i = e12(T1,i, gd⃗1,i)e(gη, g)α̃
1
i , e(g, g)α
2




gb⃗1,i = gd⃗1,i , . . . , gb⃗4,i = gd⃗4,i}
using the terms given in the assumption (for each attribute i controlled by a
good authority). It gives these to A.
B must now answer random oracle and key queries made by A. When
A first queries for H(GID), B chooses two random exponents h̃1GID, h̃
2
GID ∈ Zp.







GID) to A and stores the
values so that it can respond consistently if A queries H(GID) again.
When A queries for a key for an identity, attribute pair (GID, i) where
i is controlled by a good authority, B responds as follows. The first time GID
is queried, B chooses random values ξ̃1GID, ξ̃
2































Recalling that B∗i = D∗P,i, we can calculate the coefficients of b⃗∗5,i, . . . , b⃗∗8,i
in the exponent vector of Ki,GID. We let −ξ1GID denote the coefficient of d⃗∗5:
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this ξ1GID will be equal to ξ̃
1
GID when the τ3 term is absent from T1,i and will be
equal to ξ̃1GID − τ3 otherwise. (Either way, ξ1GID is properly distributed.) The
coefficients of b⃗∗5,i, . . . , b⃗
∗














where ξ2GID = ψ
−1ξ̃2GID. (We note that (−ξ1GID,−ξ̃2GID, 0, 0) are the coefficients
of the exponent vector in terms of the basis D∗i . To obtain the coefficients in
terms of the basis D∗P,i, we multiply by P t.) This shows that the keys produced
by B are properly distributed as permanent semi-functional keys.
At some point, A declares messages M0,M1 and a ℓ× n access matrix
(A, ρ). We let B ⊆ [ℓ] denote the set of indices j such that ρ(j) is controlled
by a corrupt authority and B ⊆ [ℓ] denote its complement. A also declares the
public keys for all ρ(j) such that j ∈ B. To encryptMb, B proceeds as follows.
It chooses a random s ∈ Zp and a random vector v ∈ Znp with s as its first entry.
It chooses random vectors w̃1, w̃2 ∈ Znp with first entries equal to 0. It chooses
random vectors θ̃, θ3, θ4 ∈ Znp subject to the constraint that each is orthogonal
to all rows Aj of A with j ∈ B. It chooses a random vector w̃ ∈ Znp with first
entry equal to 0 also subject to the constraint that it is orthogonal to all rows
Aj of A with j ∈ B. It will implicitly set w1 = µ1w̃ + w̃1, w2 = µ2w̃ + w̃2,
θ1 = µ3θ̃, and θ
2 = ψµ3(θ̃+w̃). We note that w
1, w2 are distributed as random
vectors with first entry equal to 0, while θ1, . . . , θ4 are distributed as random
vectors orthogonal to all Aj such that j ∈ B (note that ψ, µ3 are nonzero with
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all but negligible probability).
For all j ∈ B, B chooses random values r1j , r2j ∈ Zp. For all j ∈ B,




j , . . . , γ
4
j ∈ Zp and implicitly sets r1j = r̃1j +
µ1Aj · θ̃ and r2j = r̃2j + µ2Aj · θ̃. It computes the ciphertext as:
C = Mbe(g, g)
s,




























































)γ4j+Aj ·θ4 ∀j ∈ B




















)r2j+Aj ·w̃2 ∀j ∈ B.
In creating Cj for j ∈ B, we have used the fact that Aj · w̃ = 0 for these values
of j.
We observe that the coefficients of the exponent vector of Cj for j ∈ B










γ1j + Aj · (µ3θ̃)
γ2j
γ2j + Aj · (ψµ3(θ̃ + w̃))
 .
This demonstrates the implicit assignments for θ1, θ2 claimed above.
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Now, we examine the exponents of the Dj values for j ∈ B. If the τ3








as required in GameQ. If the τ3 term is present, then we have an extra con-
tribution of τ3µ3Aj · θ̃. This is equivalent to replacing the sharing vector v by
v + τ3µ3θ̃. Crucially, the value of τ3 is only involved elsewhere in ξ
1
GID, but
its contribution is masked by the random value ξ̃1GID and θ̃ has a nonzero first
entry, since the collection of rows Aj for j ∈ B is not allowed to include the
vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in its span. Thus, v+τ3µ3θ̃ is distributed as a truly random
vector, independent of s. In this case, the ciphertext is properly distributed
as a semi-functional encryption of a random element of GT , independent of
the value of Mb, as required in Gamefinal. Thus, B can leverage A’s difference
in advantage between these games to break the subspace assumption.
Combining Lemmas 4, 28, 29, 30, and 31, Theorem 27 follows.
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Chapter 8
Further Work and Future Directions
We have now presented three CP-ABE schemes and accompanying se-
curity proofs. These results demonstrate the flexibility and breadth of the
dual system encryption paradigm, which can be used to prove full security
under simple, standard assumptions and can also leverage more complex, pa-
rameterized assumptions to prove full security for more efficient systems. We
have additionally demonstrated how it can be adapted to the functionality of
multi-authority schemes. Here, we briefly discuss further work on functional
encryption that we have presented elsewhere and open problems for future
work.
8.1 Further Work
Unbounded ABE Schemes All of the schemes we have presented here have
public parameters that scale linearly with the size of the attribute universe.
This is often called “small universe ABE.” There has also been prior work
on “large universe ABE,” which allows the size of the attribute universe to
be exponential in comparison to the size of the public parameters. The first
large universe ABE construction [39] was a KP-ABE scheme that was proven
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selectively secure and required ciphertexts to obey a preset bound on the size
of the associated attribute sets.
Requiring such a bound is an undesirable feature and is counter to
the intention of allowing greater freedom by enlarging the attribute universe.
In joint work with Waters [52], we provide a selectively secure large universe
KP-ABE scheme without any such bounds. We expect that our techniques
presented here could also be used in the large universe setting to obtain fully
secure unbounded CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes under q-type assumptions.
Such schemes would allow an exponentially large attribute universe and not
require any restrictions on the use of attributes or the size of attribute sets - this
would maintain full security without requiring any compromises on flexibility.
Leakage Resilience Motivated by side-channel attacks on real world cryp-
tosystems, many recent works have studied the problem of extending security
proofs to instances where an attacker has access to limited side-channel in-
formation about underlying secret keys. Such information is called “leakage,”
and schemes that are proven to remain secure in such contexts are called
“leakage-resilient.” There have been many different models proposed for for-
malizing leakage-resilience. In the “only computation leaks” model introduced
by Micali and Reyzin [56] (further studied in [28, 29, 37, 43], for example), it is
assumed that leakage obtained during a computation only depends on what-
ever portions of the secret state are directly involved in that computation. In
the bounded leakage model introduced by Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikun-
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tanathan [4] (further studied in [5, 6, 18, 45, 57], for example), it is assumed
that all memory can leak, but that the entire leakage obtained over the life-
time of a system is suitably bounded.
In the continual memory leakage model introduced concurrently by
Dodis, Haralambiev, Lopez-Alt, and Wichs [26] and Brakerski, Kalai, Katz,
and Vaikuntanathan [19], the most conservative approach is taken, as it is
supposed that all memory can leak, all the time - the amount of leakage is
only bounded “locally” within discrete time intervals. Working in this model
provides the most complete defense against the variety of potential leakage
attack scenarios. In this challenging setting, one must continually update
secret keys to avoid an attacker leaking an entire key.
In joint work with Rouselakis and Waters [49], we show that the dual
system encryption methodology provides convenient tools for proving leakage
resilience alongside full security. We demonstrated this by presenting fully
secure IBE, HIBE, and ABE systems resilient to bounded leakage from each
of many secret keys per user, as well as master keys. This can be realized as
resilience against continual leakage if we assume keys are periodically updated
and no (or logarithmic) leakage is allowed during the update process.
The assumption that little or no leakage is allowed during a secret key
update was shared by all early works in the continual memory leakage model
[17, 19, 26, 49, 54]. Though this assumption was necessary to implement the
proof strategies in these works, it is a very artificial and undesirable restriction
to place on the attacker. One goal of the continual memory leakage model is
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to avoid the “only computation leaks” assumption and hence obtain a more
robust result. However, the intuition behind the “only computation leaks”
assumption is that it is usually computation itself that causes leakage, not
storage. Since an update of a secret key is a computation, assuming that this
cannot leak is counter to this intuition, and merely replaces one potentially
unrealistic assumption with an opposite one.
In joint work with M. Lewko and Waters [47], we present the first
schemes (signatures and PKE) secure in the continual memory leakage model
while allowing significant amounts of leakage on the entire secret state at all
times, including during secret key updates. As long as the amount of leakage
per key update remains bounded by a certain constant fraction of the secret key
size, our schemes remain provably secure. The main technical innovation we
introduce in this work is a strategy for embedding a computational challenge
in an initial key generation and then designing a sequence of updates so that
its effect is realized only after a certain number of updates. This strategy
circumvents the primary obstacle encountered by prior proof techniques, which
required embedding a computational challenge into each update process, hence
preventing the simulator from performing the update “honestly” and knowing
all of the values it would need to compute leakage on during an update. We
extend these results in joint work with Dodis, Waters, and Wichs [27].
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8.2 Future Directions
Achieving Optimal Efficiency from Simple Assumptions The open
problem most directly suggested by our work here is the task of obtaining
fully secure ABE systems from simple (i.e. non-q-type) assumptions, without
making significant sacrifices on efficiency (we consider our encoding technique
to be a significant sacrifice). Our results suggest that accomplishing this for
CP-ABE in the selective setting will likely suffice, as a new selective proof
technique that can be leveraged within our dual system framework would
ultimately produce a proof of full security. It may also be possible to further
leverage our key isolation mechanism and take more advantage of the fact that
in some sense we need consider only a single key at a time.
More Expressive Functionalities The schemes we have presented here
allow LSSS access structures, which can efficiently express monotonic boolean
formulas, for example. These are quite versatile, but one could imagine allow-
ing even more expressive access structures, such as circuits. Allowing circuits
would enable some access policies to be expressed much more efficiently than
current systems can achieve. However, moving to structures as general as cir-
cuits poses many technical challenges, and we suspect that such an advance
would require many new ideas - perhaps in a different setting than bilinear
groups.
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Alternate Complexity Settings Given the several examples of lattice-
based cryptographic systems that have built upon ideas first developed in bi-
linear group cryptography (e.g. [1, 21]), lattice-based cryptography is a good
target for new instantiations of dual system encryption techniques. Obtain-
ing dual system proofs in the lattice-based setting would likely extend the
variety of functional encryption systems available in that realm, which are
currently limited to IBE [1, 21, 35], HIBE [1, 21], and predicate encryption
for inner product predicates [3]. It is also possible that functionality in the
lattice-based setting could eventually surpass what is achieved (or even what
is achievable) in the bilinear setting. This is the case, for instance, in the area
of homomorphic encryption, as fully homomorphic encryption was achieved
in the lattice setting by Gentry [33] and is not known to be possible in any
other context. However, expressive functional encryption primitives like ABE
present some distinct technical challenges in the lattice-based setting that have





Proof of Our q-Based Assumption in the
Generic Group Model
We prove a lower bound for the complexity of our source group q-
parallel BDHE assumption in the generic group model. In the generic group
model [66], an adversary is not given direct access to the group, but rather
only receives “handles” representing elements. It must interact with an oracle
to perform the group operation (multiplication and division are both enabled)
and obtain handles for new elements. It is assumed that it can only use
handles which it has previously received from the oracle. We consider an
experiment where an adversary is given handles for the group elements given
out in the assumption as well as a handle for the challenge term Tβ (here, β
is a uniformly random bit). The adversary may then interact with the oracle
to perform group operations and pairings and it is given the handles for the
group elements resulting from these operations. Finally, the adversary must
guess the bit β. The difference between the adversary’s success probability
and one half is defined to be its advantage. For other examples of uses of the
generic group model to justify assumptions in bilinear groups, see [12, 44].
We now develop some convenient notation. We consider c, d, f, b1, . . . , bq
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as variables over Zp, and we define M to be the following set of rational func-
tions over these variables:
M := {1, f, df, c1, . . . , cq, cq+2, . . . , c2q, ci/bj ∀i ∈ [2q] \ {q + 1}, ∀j ∈ [q],
dfbj ∀j ∈ [q], dfcibj′/bj ∀i ∈ [q], ∀j, j′ ∈ [q] s.t. j ̸= j′}.
These are the exponents of the group elements given out in our source group
q-parallel BDHE assumption. We let E(M) denote the set of all pairwise prod-
ucts of functions in M. This set of rational functions represents the exponents
of elements in GT that can be obtained by pairing elements with exponents in
M.
We say a function T is dependent on a set of functions S = {S1, . . . , Sk}
if there exist constants r1, . . . , rk ∈ Zp such that T = r1S1 + · · · + rkSk. This
is an equality of functions over Zp, and hence must hold for all settings of the
variables. If no such constants exist, we say that T is independent of S. We
begin by establishing the following lemma.
Lemma 32. For each function M ∈ M ∪ {dcq+1}, the product M · dcq+1 is
independent of E(M) ∪ dcq+1(M \M). (Here, dcq+1(M \M) denotes the set
formed by removing M from M and then multiplying all remaining elements
by dcq+1.)
Proof. We note that every element ofM∪{dcq+1} and every element of E(M)∪
dcq+1(M \ M) is a ratio of monomials. Hence, the only way M(dcq+1) can
be dependent on E(M) ∪ dcq+1(M \ M) is if it is in fact contained in the
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set E(M) ∪ dcq+1(M \ M). First, we note that d2c2q+2 is not contained in
E(M) ∪ dcq+1M. For any M ∈ M, it is clear that dcq+1M /∈ dcq+1(M \M).
Thus it suffices to prove that for eachM , dcq+1M /∈ E(M). In other words, we
must show that E(M) does not intersect with the set dcq+1M (the set formed
by multiplying each element of M by dcq+1. To see this, we examine the set
dcq+1M.
By definition, we have that
dcq+1M = {dcq+1, dfcq+1, d2fcq+1, dcq+2, . . . , dc2q+1, dc2q+3, . . . , dc3q+1,
dci/bj ∀j ∈ [q], ∀i ∈ {q + 2, . . . , 3q + 1} \ {2q + 2}, d2fbjcq+1 ∀j ∈ [q],
d2fcibj′/bj ∀i ∈ {q + 2, . . . , 2q + 1}, ∀j, j′ ∈ [q] s.t. j ̸= j′}.
We now must check if any of these are in E(M), which is the set of pairwise
products of things in M. We observe that in M, every occurrence of d is
accompanied by f and f−1 never appears: so it is impossible for E(M) to
contain any elements which have higher powers of d than f . This rules out all
of the elements in dcq+1M above except for dfcq+1.
To also rule out dfcq+1, we consider all the possible ways it might be
formed as a product of two elements of M. Since this term contains f , one
of the two factors in M must be a term containing f . We note that neither
f or df can be one of the factors, since dcq+1, cq+1 /∈ M. We note that an
element of the form dfbj cannot be one of the two factors, since c
q+1/bj /∈M.
Similarly, an element of the form dfcibj′/bj cannot be one of the two factors,
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since cq+1−ibj/bj′ /∈ M. We have thus dismissed all ways the f could be
obtained, and we conclude that dfcq+1 /∈ E(M).
We now proceed similarly to the proof strategy in [12, 44] to establish
the following theorem:
Theorem 33. For any adversary A that makes Q queries to the oracles com-
puting the group operations in G,GT and the bilinear map e : G× G → GT ,
the advantage of A against the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption in






Proof. In the real experiment, the variables c, d, f, b1, . . . , bq are first set ran-
domly, and then the adversary is given handles for the group elements corre-
sponding to the terms given out in the assumption and to Tβ. A can then issue
oracle queries for handles corresponding to products, divisions, or pairings of
elements that it already has handles for. We define a new experiment in which
the variables are never concretely instantiated, but instead the handles cor-
respond to formal functions. Two elements are now given the same handle if
and only if they are equal as formal functions over the variables.
This differs only from the real experiment when it happens that two
formal functions are unequal, but happen to coincide for the particular choice
of the variable settings. All of the functions created in the course of the
experiment are linear combinations of rational functions whose numerators
are polynomials of degree ≤ 4q and whose denominators are always among
{b1, . . . , bq}. Multiplying such a rational function by the product b1 · · · bq will
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thus yield a polynomial of degree ≤ 5q. The probability that two formal
polynomials of degree ≤ 5q are unequal but happen to be equal for a random
setting of the variables modulo p is upper bounded by 5q
p
by the Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma. Thus, the probability of the particular setting of the variables






Now, in this new experiment where formal variables are maintained,
the only way for the adversary to have any advantage in guessing β is for it
to generate a two formal functions during the course of the experiment that
are the same only when β takes a particular value. In our case, this must
mean that the attacker generates two functions that are equal only when the
challenge term is gdc
q+1
. We can rearrange terms and express this equality as
dcq+1h1 = h2 for functions h1 and h2 satisfying the following constraints: h1
must be non-zero and generated in G (so without using pairings). Thus, h1
must be a linear combination of elements of M ∪ {dcq+1}. Also, h2 must be a
linear combination of elements in E(M) (note that this set includes M since
1 ∈M). But this means that for someM ∈M∪{dcq+1}, dcq+1M is dependent
on E(M) ∪ dcq+1(M \M), contradicting Lemma 32.
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